Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction by Andrews, Carol Rice
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction 
Carol Rice Andrews 
University of Alabama - School of Law, candrews@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
Carol R. Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 999 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/33 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
ANOTHER LOOK AT GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
Carol Andrews'
General personal jurisdiction-whereby a state court asserts
jurisdiction over a defendant on claims unrelated to the defendant's
activities in the forum state-has long been a doctrine with
uncertain parameters. It was the primary, but untested, form of
personal jurisdiction under Pennoyer v. Neff.1 The Supreme Court
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington2 recognized general
jurisdiction as one of two basic types of jurisdiction under minimum
contacts analysis but did little to define it. Lower courts struggled
for decades with general jurisdiction. In the 1980s, Professors Lea
Brilmayer 3 and Mary Twitchell 4 engaged in extensive debate
concerning general jurisdiction. Other scholars weighed in.6 Since
* Douglas Arant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of
Law.
1. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
2. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
3. See generally Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV 721 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., General
Look]; Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 (1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count]; Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1444 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Related Contacts].
4. See generally Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARv. L. REV. 610 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell, Myth]; Mary Twitchell, A
Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1988) [hereinafter
Twitchell, Rejoinder]. See also Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business
with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172-79 (2001)
[hereinafter Twitchell, Doing Business].
5. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119 (2001); Sarah R. Cebik, 'A Riddle
Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma" General Personal Jurisdiction and
Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (1998); Mark M. Maloney,
Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the "Arise From Or Related To"
Requirement ... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265 (1993);
Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807
(2004); Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For"
Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1545 (1994); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal
Jurisdiction: It's Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It
Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 (1998) [hereinafter Simard, Hybrid
Jurisdiction]; Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for
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the 1980s, the Court has been nearly silent on all matters of
personal jurisdiction. In 2011, the Court broke the silence in two
new cases: Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown6 and J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.7 Goodyear is only the Court's
third case addressing general jurisdiction. McIntyre, a specific
jurisdiction case, gives insights as to the philosophy of current
members of the Court regarding personal jurisdiction as a whole. In
this Article, I use the standards of Goodyear and the policy debate of
McIntyre as a springboard for a "fresh look"8 at general jurisdiction.
In Part I, I review the history of general personal jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction was the usual form of jurisdiction under
Pennoyer, but, in the early period, the distinction between unlimited
and specific jurisdiction largely was irrelevant. As the world
modernized and disputes more frequently crossed state lines, the
breadth of the jurisdiction became a more pressing concern. Courts
developed a variety of theories and fictions, which provided
inconsistent results, particularly as to jurisdiction over corporate
defendants. In International Shoe, the Court substituted a new
analysis, in the form of the minimum contacts test, and recognized
that jurisdiction could be either general or specific. 9 The new test
shifted emphasis to specific jurisdiction and left the role and scope of
general jurisdiction relatively uncertain.
In Part II, I explore the policies that underlie general personal
jurisdiction. The lack of a coherent policy rationale has been a
persistent academic criticism of general jurisdiction. Indeed, the
Specific Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REv. 343 (2005) [hereinafter Simard, Two
Profiles]; Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1987); Diane P. Wood,
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597 (1987). I joined
the debate by analyzing general jurisdiction tests and policies as applied to
national class actions. See generally Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal
Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate About "Class Action
Fairness," 58 SMU L. REV. 1313 (2005).
6. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
7. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
8. I draw inspiration for this term from Professor Brilmayer's seminal
article, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, supra note 3. I am not alone in
my review of McIntyre and Goodyear. The South Carolina Law Review held a
symposium in October 2011, in which Professor Brilmayer and other scholars
addressed the cases. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The
(Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear
Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV.
617 (2012). Professor Stein examined the implications of Goodyear on general
jurisdiction. See generally Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home"
in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012). Meir Feder, counsel in the
Goodyear case, also addressed its impact. See generally Meir Feder, Goodyear,
"Home" and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 671 (2012).
9. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Court cannot seem to reach a consensus on the policies underlying
any form of personal jurisdiction. This divide was particularly
evident in the differences between Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion and Justice Ginsburg's dissent in McIntyre. I use this
current debate to frame the Court's policy statements as to personal
jurisdiction as a whole, and I then explore the policies supporting
general jurisdiction in particular. I propose that the best guide to
the policies relevant to general jurisdiction are the two factors that
the Court set out in International Shoe: the relatedness of the
defendant's forum contacts to the plaintiffs claim and the extent of
those contacts. I examine why these two factors are critical to the
outcome of minimum contacts analysis. I propose that the two
factors help ensure the fairness of personal jurisdiction in four ways:
(1) they help achieve reciprocity between the benefits and burdens of
acting in a state; (2) they promote predictability; (3) they limit state
sovereignty; and (4) they assure a minimum level of convenience.
These four fairness components in turn are useful guideposts for
testing the parameters of the two factors themselves-relatedness
and extent of contacts.
In Part III, I examine in detail the threshold question of
whether a contact is related. This question marks the dividing line
between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Because the
Court has not addressed the question, courts and scholars have
developed a variety of tests for relatedness, ranging from strict legal
causation to noncausal similarity. I evaluate a variety of tests
under both the Court's jurisdiction cases and the four fairness
concerns. I conclude that the proper test for relatedness is one
based on causation that requires a "meaningful link" between the
defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiffs claim.
In Part IV, I develop the many issues that arise in general
jurisdiction analysis once the claim is deemed unrelated. I start
with the basic question of the extent of contacts necessary for
general jurisdiction. This has been the source of confusion: courts
and commentators for decades labored to apply a vague "continuous
and systematic" standard. I argue that the Court appropriately
clarified this standard in Goodyear and announced the test to be the
place at which the defendant is "at home." I then apply this at-home
standard and assess whether several common factual situations
meet the standard for general jurisdiction.
I conclude with a capsule summary of the lessons drawn from
this new look at general personal jurisdiction. First, general
jurisdiction analysis applies to all claims that have no meaningful
causal link to the defendant's forum state contacts. Second, general
jurisdiction is proper only in the single state (or, very rarely, the
very few states) in which the defendant currently is at home. Both
standards strike the proper balance between the plaintiffs choice of
forum and the four fairness concerns underlying jurisdictional
2012] 1001
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analysis-reciprocity of benefit and burden, predictability,
sovereignty, and convenience. Although these standards do not
eliminate all uncertainty, they clarify the questions and
significantly advance general jurisdiction analysis.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
In the Pennoyer era, before International Shoe, the primary
bases for personal jurisdiction were general and did not require that
the claim relate to the forum state. As courts extended the Pennoyer
bases to fit the modern era, many struggled with the extent of that
jurisdiction, whether general or specific. This struggle was
particularly troublesome with regard to corporations. Courts
applied the fictional concepts of corporate presence and implied
corporate consent with mixed results. The Court in International
Shoe eliminated some of the confusion by discarding these fictions
and substituting a new minimum contacts analysis. In doing so, the
Court recognized that although many exercises of specific
jurisdiction would satisfy the minimum contacts test, many
exercises of general jurisdiction would not.
A. General Jurisdiction in the Pennoyer Era
Under Pennoyer, a state court could assert jurisdiction over a
defendant if, at the beginning of the suit, the defendant was found
and served in the forum state, or if his property in the state was
properly attached.10 Without physical power over the defendant or
his property, the assertion of jurisdiction violated the defendant's
right to due process, and any resulting judgment was void and
unenforceable." This physical power rule had two exceptions-suits
determining the marital status of forum citizens and suits in which
the defendant consented to jurisdiction-but in all other cases, a
10. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1877), overruled in part by
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court based its holding on general
principles of law because the judgment preceded enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the Court also stated that due process would test the limits of
proper jurisdiction thereafter. Id. at 733.
11. Initially, courts applied Pennoyer to enforcement of judgments in
subsequent proceedings, but the Court later held that a judgment entered
without jurisdiction was itself a violation of due process. See Riverside & Dan
River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1915) ("[Tlhe fact that
because unobservedly or otherwise judgments have been rendered in violation
of the due process clause and their enforcement has been refused under the full
faith and credit clause affords no ground for refusing to apply the due process
clause and preventing that from being done which is by it forbidden and which




state court's jurisdiction required in-state service on the defendant
or attachment of the defendant's in-state property. 12
The two primary bases for personal jurisdiction-physical in-
state presence of either the person or the property of the
defendant-encompassed both specific and general jurisdiction. If a
court had power over the person or his property, it had jurisdiction
regardless of whether the suit related to the person's activities in
the state or his property. The state had power to adjudicate a claim
that arose outside the forum. Only a few forms of jurisdiction under
Pennoyer were case specific. The best example is the marital status
exception, which necessarily was limited to marital status. A state
could not assert jurisdiction over an absent defendant on other civil
claims solely because his wife was present in the forum state.
Likewise, most forms of consent-based jurisdiction were limited to
the particular matter. If, for example, a person agreed in a contract
to forum state jurisdiction over all claims arising from that contract,
the resulting jurisdiction was specific to that contract. These
distinctions between limited and general jurisdiction, however, were
rarely tested. Although broad general jurisdiction was theoretically
possible in many cases, it often was unnecessary because the suits
tended to be local and related to the forum.13
This distinction between specific jurisdiction over particular
claims and unlimited jurisdiction over any claims proved more
problematic as the courts attempted to expand the Pennoyer
jurisdictional bases to fit the modernizing world. As people became
more mobile and corporations became a common business form,
courts and lawmakers began to more frequently consider the
breadth of jurisdiction. In some applications, the distinctions were
easy or obvious. The treatment of jurisdiction in the early
automobile cases is a good example. The Court permitted state
court jurisdiction over absent drivers through theories of express or
implied consent, but such jurisdiction was specific and limited to
suits arising from the defendant's driving in the forum state. 14 The
state could not assert jurisdiction over an unrelated contract claim,
12. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733 (holding that, "[e]xcept in cases affecting the
personal status of the plaintiff, and cases in which that mode of service may be
considered to have been assented to in advance," a defendant must be
personally served in the state or his property must be brought under the control
of the court).
13. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 4, at 614-18 (describing "the [e]arly
Isitatus of [g]eneral j]urisdiction" and noting the legal and practical
considerations that tended to make actions local).
14. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (allowing implied
appointment of agent for service of process in suits arising out of driving in
Massachusetts); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916) (permitting
actual appointment of in-state agent for service on suits arising out of driving in
New Jersey).
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for example, solely because the absent defendant had once driven in
the forum state.
Jurisdiction over corporations was not as easy or obvious. 15 The
conceptual difficulty, which preceded Pennoyer, coincided with the
law's evolving treatment of the corporate structure. In the early
nineteenth century, courts considered corporations incapable of
acting beyond the borders of the state in which they were
incorporated.' 6 Because a corporation could act only in its state of
incorporation, jurisdiction was limited to that state. By the mid-
nineteenth century, courts permitted a corporation to act in another
state, outside of its state of incorporation, but only with the other
state's permission. Most states conditioned this permission on the
corporation's affirmative consent to jurisdiction in the state, usually
as part of the formal registration process, through appointment of
an in-state agent for service of process.' 7 The Court soon expanded
this doctrine to hold that even when a corporation failed to
affirmatively consent to jurisdiction, the state could imply consent
from the corporation's act of doing business in the state.'8 In
Pennoyer, the Court recognized this scheme and explained that both
express and implied consent provide a basis for jurisdiction over
corporations.19
15. See generally GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77-100 (photo. reprint 1999)
(1918) (tracing early history and development of jurisdictional principles about
corporations).
16. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839)
("[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created."); see also Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578
(1958).
17. In 1855, the Court stated this common condition: a "corporation created
by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the consent, express or
implied, of the latter State," and "[t]his consent may be accompanied by such
conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose," including in-state service of
process. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855).
18. Id. at 407-08; see also R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. 65, 81 (1870) ("[A
corporation] cannot migrate, but may exercise its authority in a foreign
territory upon such conditions as may be prescribed by the law of the
place.... If it does business there it will be presumed to have assented and will
be bound accordingly.").
19. The Court stated:
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association, within its limits,
or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent . . . in the
State to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings
instituted with respect to such partnership, association or
contracts ... and provide, upon their failure, to make such
appointment ... that service may be made upon a public officer
designated for that purpose ....
1004 [Vol. 47
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After Pennoyer, many courts, including the Supreme Court,
suggested an additional or alternative theory of corporate
jurisdiction based on corporate presence. Under the presence
theory, a corporation that conducted a certain level of in-state
business was deemed to be present and subject to jurisdiction in the
state.20  Courts and regulators tended to use the term "doing
business" to describe the level of in-state activity that would trigger
jurisdiction under either the presence or the implied consent
theory.21 No single theory predominated. Particular states and
courts typically chose to use only one theory-implied consent or
presence-but the Supreme Court treated both as proper. The
particular theory, however, tended to impact the jurisdictional
consequences of the corporation's in-state activities, especially as to
whether the jurisdiction was general or specific to the in-state
activities, and these consequences were far from certain.
In Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough22 and Simon v.
Southern Railway Co.,23 the Court held that implied consent to
appointment of a state officer for service of process necessarily was
limited to claims arising from the corporation's in-state activity.
Yet, only a few years later, in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v.
Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,24 the Court held that actual
appointment of an agent for service of process could authorize
general jurisdiction over claims having no relation to the forum
state. 25 The Court distinguished Old Wayne and Simon as cases of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
20. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226-28 (1913)
(considering various "doing business" standards for determining "the presence
of the corporation within the jurisdiction of the court").
21. See Kurland, supra note 16, at 584 (noting that the application of either
the consent or the presence doctrine "created difficulties, for whichever was
chosen it became necessary to determine whether the foreign corporation was
'doing business' within the state, either to decide whether its 'consent' could
properly be 'implied,' or to discover whether the corporation was 'present'). See
generally HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 84-100 (discussing the two competing
theories of implied consent and actual presence).
22. 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907) (rejecting jurisdiction over an Indiana insurance
company that did business in Pennsylvania because "it cannot be held that the
company agreed that the service of process upon the insurance commissioner of
that commonwealth would alone be sufficient to bring it into court with respect
to all business transacted by it, no matter where, with, or for the benefit of,
citizens of Pennsylvania").
23. 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1915) ("[The) power to designate by statute the
officer upon whom service in suits against foreign corporations may be made
relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction of the state enacting
the law.... [T]he statutory consent to be served does not extend to causes of
action arising in other states.").
24. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
25. Id. at 95-96.
2012]1 1005
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fictional consent: "[W]hen a power actually is conferred by a
document, the party executing it takes the risk of the interpretation
that may be put upon it by the courts."26
In the corporate presence cases, the Supreme Court did not
directly address whether the claim must be related to the corporate
defendant's forum activities. A few courts held that a corporation's
presence through doing business was analogous to the physical
presence of a natural person and, accordingly, permitted the state to
exercise general jurisdiction over the corporation.27 Commentators
of the era also observed that lack of relationship was in fact a
critical factor (albeit unstated) in most cases in which the Supreme
Court invalidated jurisdiction. 28
These distinctions created anomalies. 29  The same level of
activities ("doing business") conferred different levels of jurisdiction
depending on whether the court used a theory of implied consent or
presence, and under consent theory, a corporation who defied
registration statutes could face lesser jurisdictional consequences
than a corporation who complied and registered. 30 Judge Learned
Hand called for reform in an influential case cited by the Court in
International Shoe.31 Judge Hand decried the developing doctrine
under which "an outlaw who refused to obey the laws of the state
would be in better position than a corporation which chooses to
conform" and which confused "a legal fiction with a statement of
fact."32
Also bearing on the extent of jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporations was a minor line of cases in which the Court used the
Dormant Commerce Clause to test jurisdiction that otherwise
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268 (1917)
(quoting Phila. & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917)) ("[T]he
jurisdiction does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation
in its origin to the business here transacted. . . . The essential thing is that the
corporation shall have come into the state."); see also Kurland, supra note 16, at
582-83 ("A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal
liability, in the absense of consent, only if doing business within the State in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present
there.").
28. Note, What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign Corporation for
Purposes of Jurisdiction, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1929) ("Few courts
consider directly where the cause arose . . . . [W]hile courts continue to talk in
the traditional jargon . .. whether the cause of action arose in the forum is more
often than not the determinative factor.").
29. See generally HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 96-100; Kurland, supra
note 16, at 584-86.
30. See Kurland, supra note 16, at 579-80.
31. Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); see Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)
(citing Smolik, 222 F. at 151).
32. Smolik, 222 F. at 150-51.
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satisfied the due process limits of Pennoyer.33 These cases involved
corporations engaged in interstate commerce, usually railroads,
where the plaintiff relied upon a form of general jurisdiction under
Pennoyer, commonly consent or attachment of in-state property.
Lack of relationship was a key factor. The only cases in which the
Court invalidated state court jurisdiction under the Dormant
Commerce Clause involved claims that arose outside the forum
state.34 The theory was that a state could not unduly burden
interstate commerce by asserting jurisdiction, or extracting consent
to jurisdiction, over claims unrelated to the state. The lack of
relationship in these cases tended to be extreme, in that even the
plaintiff had little or no relation to the forum state.
In sum, in the era immediately preceding International Shoe,
the concept of general personal jurisdiction was an integral part of
the law of personal jurisdiction. Yet, its parameters, especially as
applied to corporations, were not well understood. In International
Shoe, the Court adopted a new approach, which embraced the
concept of general personal jurisdiction but also failed to define it.
B. General Jurisdiction Under International Shoe Minimum
Contacts Analysis
In 1945, the Court in International Shoe v. Washington spoke
directly to the confusion regarding the due process limits on
corporate jurisdiction.35 The Court discarded both the consent and
presence theories as unnecessary fictions. In their place, the Court
33. See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers' Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317-18
(1923) (holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause forbade Minnesota from
asserting jurisdiction over a Kansas railroad on a claim that was brought by a
Kansas corporation and that arose in Kansas and noting that although the case
resembled two cases in which the Court previously had upheld jurisdiction, "in
both cases, the only constitutional objection asserted was violation of the due
process clause").
34. See id. at 316-17 (noting that the statutory authorization of jurisdiction
might withstand commerce clause scrutiny if, among other things, "the
transaction out of which [the claim] arose had been entered upon within the
[forum] state" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Missouri ex rel. St.
Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207 (1924) (upholding
jurisdiction against a commerce clause challenge and distinguishing Davis, in
part based on possibility that the suit at issue in Taylor concerned negligence in
the forum state). That a cause of action arose outside the state, however, did
not necessarily mean that the Court would invalidate the assertion of
jurisdiction as unreasonably burdening interstate commerce. The Court also
looked at other factors, including party residence. See Hoffman v. Missouri ex
rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1927) (upholding Missouri state court
jurisdiction over a claim that arose in Kansas where the defendant was
incorporated in Missouri).
35. The Court did not address the Dormant Commerce Clause theory. It
cited the Davis case but limited its discussion of jurisdiction to the proper due
process test for corporate jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
10072012]
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created a new minimum contacts test for jurisdiction. The
minimum contacts test asks whether the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with the state so that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."36  The aim of the minimum contacts test,
according to the Court, is to more directly ask the question that had
been at the heart of both the presence and implied consent cases:
whether it is fair to subject the corporation to jurisdiction. 37
To illustrate and give meaning to the new test, the Court
collected many of its prior decisions from the Pennoyer era and
grouped them into four categories. 38 According to the Court, the
easiest case for finding jurisdiction (what I call the "easy yes" case)
was one "when the activities of the corporation [in the forum] have
not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued upon."39 At the other extreme, the easiest case
against jurisdiction (the "easy no" case) was one where the
corporation had "isolated" forum activities "unconnected" to the
claim.40  The more difficult cases (the two "maybe" cases) for
deciding jurisdiction, according to the Court, were those in which
the two factors were mixed-extensive but unrelated contacts4' or
36. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
37. Id. at 316-17 (stating that "presence" in its prior decisions was "used
merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process");
id. at 318 (stating that some of its earlier jurisdiction decisions were "supported
by resort to the legal fiction that [the corporation] has given its consent to
service and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state through
the acts of its authorized agents" and that "more realistically it may be said
that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction").
38. Id. at 311-19. The Court in Goodyear recounted these four categories
and described them as giving "specific content to the 'fair play and substantial
justice' concept" of International Shoe. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
39. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 ('Presence' in the state . . . has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even
though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of
process has been given." (citations omitted)).
40. Id. ("Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of
activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to
suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.... To require
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to
comport with due process." (citations omitted)).
41. Id. at 318 ("While it has been held ... that continuous activity of some
sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, .. . there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
1008 [Vol. 47
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isolated but related contacts.42 Jurisdiction in either "maybe" case
could fail or satisfy the demands of due process, depending on the
facts of each case.
The Court now labels the two categories of cases in which the
plaintiffs claim is related to the defendant's forum state contacts
(the "easy yes" case and one "maybe" case) as cases of "specific
personal jurisdiction."43 The other two International Shoe categories
-cases where the claim is unrelated to the defendant's forum
contacts (the "easy no" case and the other "maybe" case)-are cases
of "general personal jurisdiction."44 In all four categories, the Court
manipulated two key factors: the extent of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state and the relatedness of those contacts to the
plaintiffs claims. The Court did not explain why these two factors
were important, but the Court's four illustrations demonstrate their
importance.
First, in terms of the number of contacts, extensive contacts by
themselves might have been enough for proper jurisdiction in some
cases without relatedness (a "maybe" case), but relatedness moved
the substantial contacts case to the "easy yes" category. Likewise,
where the defendant had only a few contacts with the forum, the
relationship of the contacts to the claim might have been enough to
justify jurisdiction (a "maybe" case), but lack of relationship was
absolutely fatal to jurisdiction (the "easy no" category). In other
words, relatedness was a positive factor, and lack of relatedness was
a negative factor. Likewise, an extensive amount of contacts was a
positive factor, and a low amount was negative.
The Court's classification scheme also illustrates the relative
role of specific jurisdiction, on the one hand, and general
jurisdiction, on the other, Specific jurisdiction is relatively easy to
establish-the cases were either in the "easy yes" category or, at
worst, in the "maybe" category. By contrast, general jurisdiction is
more difficult, either an "easy no" or a "maybe" case. Extensive
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." (citations
omitted)).
42. Id. ("[A]lthough the commission of some single or occasional acts of the
corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the
corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce
it, . . . other such acts, because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit." (citations omitted)).
43. The Court adopted this terminology in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984), based on an
influential article by Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman:
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-
64 (1966).
44. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
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contacts are essential to general jurisdiction but not necessarily
enough. Cases of specific jurisdiction over related claims are more
likely to satisfy the minimum contacts test than cases of general
jurisdiction. Indeed, in Goodyear, the Court quoted Professor
Twitchell's observation that "in the wake of International Shoe,
'specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern
jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced
role."'45
Not surprisingly, the Court since International Shoe has focused
on the more common case of specific jurisdiction, attempting to
answer when the "maybe" case of an isolated but related contact
satisfies due process and when it does not. The most important
development in the specific jurisdiction cases was the "purposeful
availment" factor, first announced in the 1958 case Hanson v.
Denckla.46 In 1980, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson 47 further refined minimum contacts analysis for specific
personal jurisdiction by breaking the test into two parts, each
correlating to a separate function.48 The first prong primarily looks
to whether the defendant's related forum contact was sufficiently
purposeful and ensures "that the States through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system."49  The second prong
"protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant
or inconvenient forum"50 and balances that burden against other
45. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2854 (2011) (quoting Twitchell, Myth, supra note 4, at 628).
46. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). "[I]t is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253.
47. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
48. Id. at 291-92; see Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the
Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV.
551, 565 (2012) (observing that World-Wide Volkswagen "brought clarity" on
several fronts, including that "the International Shoe test consists of two parts:
contact and fairness"); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land:
Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63
S.C. L. REV. 481, 485 (2012) (concluding that World- Wide Volkswagen "presaged
a two-step approach to personal jurisdiction that crystallized during the
1980s").
49. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
50. Id. I have reversed the order of the two functions, as originally stated
by the Court. The Court considers the sovereignty function to be the crucial
first inquiry:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for the litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
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factors, including the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs interest
in suit in the forum, interstate judicial efficiency, "and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental social
policies."5 1
The Court has been relatively quiet on the question of general
jurisdiction. Until Goodyear, the Court had issued only two holdings
regarding whether general jurisdiction was proper under minimum
contacts analysis: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.52 and
Helicopteros Nacionaloes de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol).53 In
Perkins, the Court upheld general jurisdiction in Ohio over a foreign
corporation, engaged in mining in the Philippines, that had
temporarily moved its limited business operations to Ohio during
the pendency of World War II.54 Thirty-two years later, in Helicol,
the Court rejected general jurisdiction in Texas over a Columbian
helicopter charter business, despite the company's purchase of
helicopters in Texas, negotiation of the charter service with the
decedent's Texas employer, and acceptance of checks drawn on a
Texas bank.55 The defendant in Helicol, according to the Court, did
not have the level of general business contacts that the Court found
in Perkins.56 In Goodyear, twenty-seven years later, the Court
rejected general jurisdiction in North Carolina over foreign-national
manufacturers that had a "small percentage" of tire sales in North
Carolina.57 The unanimous Court held that the tire sales were like
the contacts in Helicol and fell short of the level of business contacts
in Perkins.58  North Carolina was not the "home" of the
defendants.5 9
The Court has left open many questions regarding general
personal jurisdiction. The biggest void is the threshold question of
whether the plaintiffs claim is unrelated to the defendant's forum
contacts (thereby triggering general jurisdiction analysis), or related
(thereby triggering specific jurisdiction analysis under the two-part
World-Wide Volkswagen test). Even assuming an unrelated claim
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254). Five years after World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court explained that the first "contacts" prong was the
"constitutional touchstone." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985).
51. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citation omitted).
52. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
53. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
54. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-49.
55. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 416-18.
56. Id.
57. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct 2846, 2852
(2011).
58. Id. at 2856-57.
59. Id. at 2857.
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and general jurisdiction analysis, the Court has not entirely settled
the question of the necessary extent of contacts. Although the Court
seemingly set an at-home standard in Goodyear, questions remain
as to the proper application of this standard. When is the proper
time for judging the extent of contacts? Does general jurisdiction
based on contacts (as opposed to general jurisdiction based on in-
state tag service) apply at all to natural persons? Can a corporation
have multiple places in which it is subject to general jurisdiction? Is
the doctrine one of strict categories, or is there some "hybrid" form,
or "sliding scale," of intermediate degrees of relatedness and
contacts? An analysis of the Court's personal jurisdiction cases,
along with the policies underlying jurisdictional analysis, helps
answer these questions.
II. THE POLICY RATIONALES FOR GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The policies underlying general jurisdiction should help resolve
the open questions regarding general jurisdiction. The problem is
that the policies themselves are not settled. Even with respect to
personal jurisdiction as a whole, the Court has cited a wide range of
policy concerns, including sovereignty, convenience, predictability, a
balance of benefits and burdens, plaintiffs' interests, judicial
efficiency, and substantive policies. The Court rarely has addressed
the particular policies underlying general jurisdiction,60 and this
silence has caused academic commentators and courts to propose
various theories and applications of general jurisdiction.
I start my policy analysis by surveying the Court's various
statements of policy in personal jurisdiction cases, almost all of
which are specific jurisdiction cases. I use International Shoe and
McIntyre as two end points to identify and categorize the policies
stated by the Court in the seventy-year lifespan of minimum
contacts analysis. I then turn to general jurisdiction. My policy
analysis focuses on the two factors that the Court listed in
International Shoe as critical to the fairness of jurisdiction in its
four example cases-relatedness and extent of contacts. I examine
the two factors in light of the Court's many subsequent
jurisdictional policy statements to assess how these two factors
impact fairness. I argue that four "fairness components" explain
why these two factors are important to the fairness of jurisdiction.
They help provide a rough reciprocity between benefits and burdens,
give some predictability, ensure limits on state sovereignty, and
protect against inconvenience.
60. See Feder, supra note 8, at 674-75 (noting the "striking paucity of
theory" underlying the Court's general personal jurisdiction cases).
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A. The Broader Policy Debate as to Personal Jurisdiction
The Court has advanced different rationales for the due process
limits on personal jurisdiction. In the Pennoyer era, the emphasis
primarily was state power, or sovereignty. This was not a perfect
fit. Some Pennoyer bases for jurisdiction, such as consent, were in
tension with the power premise. In the modern era, the Court has
vacillated as to the policy reasons underlying personal jurisdiction
analysis, emphasizing different policy concerns in different cases. In
International Shoe, the Court spoke foremost in terms of fairness:
jurisdiction must comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."6' Yet, fairness is a broad concept that can have
multiple components. As I explain below, the Court in International
Shoe mentioned several individual fairness concepts-benefits and
burdens, orderly administration of laws, federalism, and
inconvenience-each of which has become part of the policy debate
in the Court's later cases, including McIntyre.
In World- Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that the
International Shoe minimum contacts test served two functions: to
protect interstate federalism, in terms of states acting as coequal
sovereigns, and to protect the defendant from unreasonable burdens
in litigating in a distant forum. 62 The Court developed a two-part
test to serve each function, and, in explaining each prong, the Court
cited other fairness concerns. The first prong requires a nexus
between the defendant, the forum, and the claim; predictability, in
the form of purposeful availment, is an essential element of that
nexus. 63 The second prong balances the burdens of the defendant
against competing interests, including the forum state's interest, the
plaintiffs interest in that forum, judicial efficiency, and substantive
policies.64
The individual members of the Court, however, have not agreed
on the Court's articulation of each of these policies or their relative
roles. Justice Brennan, in particular, urged a different assessment
of fairness.65 For example, he long battled the Court's purposeful
availment standard as being too protective of defendants and
ignoring other interests, particularly those of the plaintiff. Indeed,
he joined in dissent from the Court's original articulation of the
61. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text
63. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
64. Id. at 292.
65. See generally Freer, supra note 48 (discussing Justice Brennan's views
on personal jurisdiction).
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purposeful availment standard in Hanson.66 Justice Brennan also
dissented in World- Wide Volkswagen, arguing that the Court
focused too tightly on the defendant and "accord[ed] too little weight
to the strength of the forum State's interest in the case and fail[ed]
to explore whether there would be any inconvenience to the
defendant."67
The philosophical divide remains among current members of the
Court, as demonstrated in McIntyre.68 McIntyre was a specific
jurisdiction case that tested the purposeful availment standard.
The plaintiff was injured at work in his home state, New Jersey, by
a recycling machine manufactured in England by the defendant.69
The defendant did not send the machine directly to New Jersey but
instead sold it to an intermediary in Ohio.70 The case asked
whether the manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey
given that it targeted a national U.S. market, which necessarily
included New Jersey, but did not target any state in particular. In a
six-to-three decision, the Court held that New Jersey could not
properly assert jurisdiction.71
Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, wrote a
dissenting opinion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a
narrow opinion concurring in the judgment and did not reach many
of the broader policy questions. The ultimate decision turned solely
on the purposeful availment standard, but the opinions by Justice
Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg reflect a sharp divide on the
fundamental policies underlying personal jurisdiction as a whole.
Justice Kennedy emphasized power and sovereignty as the
principal concerns of personal jurisdiction analysis. He began his
discussion by construing the Due Process Clause as generally
protecting "an individual's right to be deprived of . .. property only
by the exercise of lawful power."72  As applied to personal
jurisdiction, this right, according to Justice Kennedy, requires that
the defendant submit to the state's authority.73 A defendant could
66. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing for jurisdiction in cases in which the forum state has a significant
interest, unless jurisdiction would impose a "heavy and disproportionate burden
on a nonresident defendant").
67. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Goodyear did not add much to the underlying policy debate. It was a
unanimous decision in which the Court primarily applied standards for general
personal jurisdiction rather than explore the policies underlying the standards.
69. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 2785, 2791, 2794.
72. Id. at 2786.
73. Id. at 2787.
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submit to a state's authority "in a number of ways": explicit consent
(for all defendants); in-state tag service, citizenship, or domicile (for
individual defendants); and incorporation or principal place of
business (for corporate defendants).74 "Each of these examples
reveals circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is proper
to infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit
to the laws of the forum State."75  In assertions of specific
jurisdiction in product cases, Justice Kennedy described the
principal inquiry as whether the defendant's activities manifest an
intention to submit to the power of the sovereign.76
Justice Kennedy rejected broader fairness explanations for
personal jurisdiction. In particular, he condemned an approach that
he attributed to Justice Brennan, based on "general notions of
fairness and foreseeability," as "inconsistent with the premises of
lawful judicial power."7 7 "Freeform notions of fundamental fairness
divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment
rendered in the absence of authority into law."78
Justice Ginsburg rejected sovereignty as the principal concern
of personal jurisdiction analysis,79 and she characterized Justice
Kennedy's submission theory as a Pennoyer-era fiction rejected by
International Shoe.80 According to Justice Ginsburg, the "modern
approach to jurisdiction over corporations and legal entities, ushered
in by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness."81
Although Justice Ginsburg did not limit her assessment of reason
and fairness exclusively to the burden on the defendant-her
assessment included the convenience of the plaintiff and the forum
state's interest-the burden on the defendant was a dominant
factor. 82 Her focus on the defendant's burden was reflected by her
74. Id.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 2788.
77. Id. at 2789.
78. Id. at 2787.
79. "[Tihe constitutional limits on a state court's adjudicatory authority
derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty." Id. at 2798
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. "[I]nvocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is
unnecessary and unhelpful." Id. at 2799 (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472 (1985)); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)); see
also Steinman, supra note 48, at 497 (characterizing Justice Kennedy's
submission theory as a "long-discarded framework" of implied consent).
81. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. She followed her statement of "reason and fairness" with a litany of
questions laden with convenience concerns:
The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other
legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to
reason and fairness. Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode of
trading of which this case is an example, to require the international
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incredulity at Justice Kennedy's remark that different personal
jurisdiction analysis applies to federal courts because a different
sovereign is at issue.83 Noting that the defendant's burden in
defending a case in a New Jersey federal court would be the same as
that in a New Jersey state court, Justice Ginsburg concluded: "I see
no basis in the Due Process Clause for such a curious limitation."84
In other words, according to Justice Ginsburg, because the burden is
roughly the same, the propriety of jurisdiction should be the same.
Neither policy view is entirely right or entirely wrong. Fairness
is the fundamental aim of personal jurisdiction analysis. After all,
due process requires due or fair process. The question is not
whether personal jurisdiction must be fair but instead how to
measure this fairness. The Court never has measured fairness by
looking solely at the defendant's burden or convenience. To be sure,
the Court in International Shoe recognized a concern for
convenience: "An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result
to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal
place of business is relevant" to assess the fairness of personal
seller to defend at the place its products cause injury? Do not
litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that
direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be
considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey as
an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial
machines anywhere and everywhere in the United States? Is not the
burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a
reasonable cost of transacting business internationally, in
comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England
to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using McIntyre's
product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New Jersey?
Id. at 2800-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see also Steinman,
supra note 48, at 507 (noting that Justice Ginsburg's argument in McIntyre
sounded in both prongs of the World-Wide Volkswagen test).
83. "Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in
principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not
of any particular State." McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
According to Justice Kennedy, this conclusion was a "corollary" of the principle
that "personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-
sovereign, analysis." Id.
84. Justice Ginsburg stated:
The plurality suggests that the Due Process Clause might permit a
federal district court in New Jersey, sitting in diversity and applying
New Jersey law, to adjudicate McIntyre UK's liability to
Nicastro.... In other words, McIntyre UK might be compelled to
bear the burden of traveling to New Jersey and defending itself there
under New Jersey's product liability law, but would be entitled to
federal adjudication of Nicastro's state-law claim. I see no basis in
the Due Process Clause for such a curious limitation.
Id. at 2800 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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jurisdiction.85 Yet, in the immediately preceding sentence, the
Court characterized personal jurisdiction as a broader question that
turned in part on federalism concerns: the demands of due process
"may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there."86
Likewise, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court recognized both
sovereignty and convenience as concerns.87  In explaining
sovereignty in World-Wide Volkswagen, however, the Court spoke
broadly-perhaps too broadly. It stated that "the Due Process
Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the 'orderly
administration of laws."'8 In other words, the Court articulated
orderly administration of laws, which it linked to sovereignty, as a
concept distinct from "fairness." The problem with this statement is
not its recognition of sovereignty as a component of personal
jurisdiction analysis but instead its characterization of sovereignty
as a concept divorced from fairness and therefore, perhaps, a
concept divorced from due process.
The Court in International Shoe spoke of "orderly
administration of laws" as an aspect of fairness and due process. It
stated that "[w]hether due process is satisfied," in terms of personal
jurisdiction, depends "upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."89 In Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,90 the Court
clarified that the sovereignty component of personal jurisdiction
analysis does not arise from Article III but instead arises from the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 91 Importantly,
Bauxites did not remove notions of sovereignty from jurisdictional
analysis, but rather clarified that sovereignty is itself a component
of fairness.92 The defendant has a due process right to have states
act only within the limits of their sovereignty. Otherwise, the
process would not be fair or reasonable. Professor Brilmayer
concisely captured this point: "[T] he sovereignty concept inherent in
85. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (quoting
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 48-51 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1979)).
88. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 319).
89. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
90. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
91. Id. at 702.
92. Id. at 702-03 & n.10.
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the Due Process Clause is not the reasonableness of the burden but
the reasonableness of the particular State's imposing it."93
Although the debate between Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg focused on the relative roles of sovereignty and
convenience, both opinions addressed other policies. One was
predictability. The Court in World- Wide Volkswagen explained that
predictability was an element of the "orderly administration of laws"
recognized in International Shoe:
The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of laws," . .. gives a degree of predictability to
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State," . . . it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to consumers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State.94
Defining the necessary degree of predictability has been the primary
focus of the Court's specific jurisdiction cases, almost all of which,
including McIntyre, turned on the purposeful availment factor.95
Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice Ginsburg in McIntyre
objected to predictability as a relevant policy. They instead debated
the type or nature of the required predictability. Justice Kennedy
condemned reliance on "general notions" of "foreseeability" and
required a higher degree of predictability than did Justice
Ginsburg.96  Justice Ginsburg characterized the requirement of
purposeful availment as "simply" ensuring that jurisdiction will not
be based on "'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts."'97
The distinction between different types of predictability is not
new to jurisdictional analysis. The Court in World-Wide
93. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 3, at 85; see also Feder,
supra note 8, at 685-88 (exploring the role of due process in limiting a state's
sovereignty in the context of personal jurisdiction).
94. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
95. E.g., J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011)
(discussing the importance of purposeful availment to the finding of personal
jurisdiction).
96. See Steinman, supra note 48, at 492-93 (discussing the foreseeability
elements of Justice Kennedy's opinion in McIntyre and noting that the "idea is
nothing new").
97. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burger
King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
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Volkswagen distinguished between different types of predictability
or foreseeability and refused to rely upon the mere likelihood that
the defendant's product might enter the forum state.98 The key
predictability concern in specific jurisdiction cases, according to the
Court in World- Wide Volkswagen, is that the defendant, through his
actions, must "reasonably anticipate being haled [sic] into court" in
the forum state.99
Predictability has been the source of controversy in part because
the concept has so many dimensions. The Court has defined the
relevant predictability in specific jurisdiction cases as anticipation of
amenability to suit, but this standard is unsatisfying. In some
ways, it is circular or, as Professor Brilmayer put it, "incomplete."100
In other words, if a state or court announces that personal
jurisdiction may be asserted under certain conditions, the defendant
should anticipate suit under those conditions. This does not render
predictability an invalid concern. Most applications of due process,
even those outside the context of personal jurisdiction, value notice
or fair warning. The question is the type or nature of the requisite
predictability.
Another policy concern in personal jurisdiction analysis is a
quid pro quo or balance theory of fairness. One justification for
jurisdiction is that a defendant who has enjoyed benefits in a state
must bear reciprocal burdens in that state. In International Shoe,
the Court explained that when a corporation "exercises the privilege
of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state" and that the "exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations." 01 Although this policy was
not the centerpiece of the debate in McIntyre, Justice Kennedy's
submission theory arguably encompasses it in that a defendant's
submission involves both benefits and burdens. 102 Justice Ginsburg
likewise suggested some notion of reciprocal benefits and burdens
when she spoke of the burden of jurisdiction being a "reasonable
cost" of doing business. 103
98. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296-97.
99. Id. at 297.
100. Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1462; see also Rose, supra
note 5, at 1587 (noting that if all limits on personal jurisdiction were abolished,
it would be "perfectly predictable and foreseeable" to be subject to suit in all
places).
101. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
102. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (discussing a party benefitting from
the laws of a state as well as submitting itself to an otherwise foreign
sovereign).
103. Id. at 2800-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Is not the burden on
McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting
business internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to
Nottingham, England . . . .").
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Finally, Justice Ginsburg emphasized, but Justice Kennedy
downplayed, the importance of other fairness factors, such as the
plaintiffs interest in bringing suit in the particular forum and the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute.10 4 The Court has
long recognized these and other concerns, including the interests of
the interstate judicial system and, sometimes, substantive policies.
In Kulko v. Superior Court,105 the Court noted a substantive policy
to tread lightly and not discourage amicability among divorcing
couples.106 In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,107 the
Court stated that both substantive policy and judicial efficiency
concerns argued for restraint in disputes between foreign national
parties. 108 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court combined all of
these concerns as factors to weigh against the defendant's burden in
assessing the overall reasonableness of specific jurisdiction. 09
Importantly, however, the Court in World- Wide Volkswagen also
established that these were secondary concerns, at least in specific
jurisdiction cases, to be evaluated only if the defendant purposefully
availed itself of forum state benefits."10
Thus, on the specific jurisdiction side, the Court has identified a
wide range of policy concerns. For the most part, however, these
policy concerns are not freeform elements of specific jurisdiction
analysis. Instead, the Court has developed and prioritized the
policies in identifiable tests, such as the purposeful availment
standard of the first prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen test and
the competing interests of the second prong. In other words, the
Court has explained how the policies translate into a test to
evaluate the propriety of specific personal jurisdiction. Individual
members of the Court may disagree as to how the policies influence
application of each element of a test, especially the purposeful
availment standard, but the Court has set and repeatedly refined
the tests for specific jurisdiction. This is not true for general
jurisdiction.
104. Compare id. at 2800, with id. at 2783-84, 2789 (plurality opinion).
105. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
106. Id. at 94.
107. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
108. Id. at 115.
109. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
110. See id. at 294; see also Steinman, supra note 48, at 507 (noting that
plaintiff and state interest factors were secondary considerations under "the
prevailing jurisdictional framework" set by World-Wide Volkswagen and that
Justice Ginsburg's approach in McIntyre "does not draw such a stark boundary
between the two inquiries that crystallized during the 1980s").
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B. The Four Fairness Concerns Underlying the Related and Extent
of Contacts Factors
The lack of guidance from the Court as to general jurisdiction
has spurred debate among lower courts and scholars. Lower courts
have used foreseeability and quid pro quo policy arguments to shape
tests for general jurisdiction.'11 The academic policy debate tends to
be more wide ranging. The scholarly debate is best captured by the
multiple exchanges between Professors Twitchell and Brilmayer in
the 1980s. Professor Twitchell argued that there was no principled
rationale for most exercises of general jurisdiction and that general
jurisdiction should be confined to "its most essential function:
providing one forum where a defendant may always be sued."112
Professor Brilmayer offered a fuller litany of policies underlying
general jurisdiction. She developed these rationales by analyzing
what she described as the "paradigm[] . . . unique affiliations" that
permitted general personal jurisdiction: domicile of an individual
and, for corporations, the states of incorporation and principal place
of business." 3  Professor Brilmayer identified four theoretical
justifications for general jurisdiction in these locations: convenience
for the defendant, convenience for the plaintiff, state power, and
reciprocal benefits of and burdens on the defendant.114 She then
applied these policies to test and justify other bases or in her words,
proper affiliations, for general jurisdiction.
I agree with both Professors Twitchell and Brilmayer on
different points. I agree that general jurisdiction should be limited
to a defendant's home, but I offer a broad fairness rationale for that
conclusion."15 My policy rationales come closer to mirroring those of
Professor Brilmayer, except that I derive and justify them in a
different manner. Rather than looking at the end result-assumed
examples of general jurisdiction-I look at the two factors that the
Court in International Shoe identified as being crucial to analysis of
general and specific jurisdiction: relatedness and extent of contacts.
Before the Court struggled to develop and apply different policy
concerns in its specific jurisdiction cases, the Court in International
Shoe identified the factors of relatedness and extent of contacts as
111. E.g., O'Connor v. Shady Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 323 (3d Cir.
2007) (using quid pro quo and foreseeability policies to frame a test for
relatedness); see also infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text (discussing
O'Connor).
112. Twitchell, Myth, supra note 4, at 635-36, 667; see also Twitchell, Doing
Business, supra note 4, at 172, 178-81 (describing the "[b]affling [riationale" of
general jurisdiction based on "doing business").
113. Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 728-35; see also Cebik,
supra note 5, at 33-36 (developing theories of general jurisdiction based on
assumption that residence or domicile is a proper basis).
114. Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 730-35.
115. See infra Part W.A.
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crucial to the fairness of jurisdiction. 116 An analysis of these two
factors reveals four concerns that influence the fairness of
jurisdiction: reciprocity, predictability, state sovereignty, and
convenience. The relatedness and extent of contacts factors are
important to fairness because each helps to (1) ensure a rough
reciprocity between benefits and burdens, (2) promote predictability,
(3) limit state sovereignty, and (4) guard against inconvenience.
These are not tests but instead broad explanations of what makes
jurisdiction fair or unfair.
Reciprocity is shorthand for a relative balance between the
forum state benefits that the defendant enjoys and the forum
burdens that he must bear in the form of adjudicative jurisdiction.
In other words, because a corporation received benefits from the
state, it is fair for the corporation to bear burdens in the state in the
form of jurisdiction over it, but only burdens that are roughly equal
to the benefits. It is a variation on a quid pro quo theory of fairness.
Reciprocity does not require an exact balance but is instead a rough
measure to help assure fairness. A system is fair when the benefits
and burdens of that system are proportionate.
Both the relatedness and extent of contacts factors help achieve
reciprocity. First, as to the relatedness factor, the Court in
International Shoe explained that because relatedness helps achieve
a balance of benefits and burdens, it helps ensure fairness: "[S]o far
as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue."117 In other words, because the claim
over which the forum state asserts jurisdiction (the burden) is
related to the defendant's forum activities (the benefit), the burdens
and benefits are proportionate, and the procedure is not "undue" or
unfair.118
Reciprocity also helps explain the extent of contacts factor. In
this context, a concern for reciprocity asks whether the contacts are
so extensive and the benefits so great as to justify great burdens in
the form of general jurisdiction. Under general jurisdiction, a
defendant is subject to jurisdiction on any and all claims, no matter
where the claims arose. The potential burden, in terms of
116. See text accompanying supra notes 41-44.
117. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
118. See Rose, supra note 5, at 1561-64 (describing this policy concern as
embodying several principles: "proportionality" of benefits and burdens,
nonaffiliation-by which defendants can sever or avoid contact-and
"consent/exchange"); Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 4, at 175 ("A quid-
pro-quo justification works well for specific jurisdiction" because "the scope of
the risk of being subject to jurisdiction in the state is proportionate to the scope
of the defendant's forum-related activities").
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jurisdiction over claims, is unlimited. The Court in International
Shoe did not specify this balance, but it did describe the target
balance point: "[Instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities."1 19  Mere continuity or
multiplicity of contacts is not enough. Indeed, the Court began this
sentence with the point that "continuous activity of some sorts
within a state is not enough."120 The benefits must be substantial
enough that they offset almost unlimited burdens, in the form of
general jurisdiction on any claim, arising anywhere. If the
defendant received few benefits from the forum state, it would be
unfair to impose unlimited or extensive burdens.
A second fairness rationale is predictability. Although the
Court traditionally uses this rationale to support the purposeful
availment standard in specific jurisdiction analysis of related
claims, predictability also explains the more fundamental
International Shoe factors of relatedness and extent of contacts.
Indeed, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,121 the Court noted that
the "'fair warning' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the
forum,... and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise
out of or relate to' those activities."122
As to relatedness, in order for a defendant to properly structure
its behavior, it not only must know that a contact has been made in
a particular state (an aim protected through the purposeful
availment standard), but it also must have some minimal
appreciation of the effect of that contact. 123  The relationship
standard helps give this appreciation. Without some form of
relatedness standard, the defendant would not be able to predict the
119. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. To some extent, reciprocity overlaps with
predictability. See O'Connor v. Shady Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 322 (3d
Cir. 2007) ("The animating principle behind the relatedness requirement is the
notion of a tacit quid pro quo that makes litigation in the forum reasonably
foreseeable."); see also infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text (discussing
O'Connor, 496 F.3d 312).
120. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see supra note 41 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 318).
121. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
122. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1985)).
123. See uBID, Inc. v. Godaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting RAR, Inc., v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1278 (7th Cir. 1997))
(arguing that relatedness helps give people "confidence that 'transactions in one
context will not come back to haunt them unexpectedly in another').
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jurisdictional consequences of its actions.124 Any action of any type
in a state might open up jurisdiction on a claim arising from other
actions elsewhere. A requirement of relatedness helps the
defendant appreciate the claims, or types of claims, subject to
specific jurisdiction.
The predictability concern underlying relatedness overlaps
with, but is distinct from, the predictability concern underlying the
purposeful availment factor. Relatedness focuses more on the claim,
and purposeful availment focuses more on the forum. An
assessment of predictability in either context should take the
protection of the other into account. So, for example, where the
purposeful availment standard by itself cannot achieve
predictability, relatedness must do so.
In contrast, in general jurisdiction cases, the extent of contacts
factor arguably acts alone in providing predictability. On this side,
the question is whether the defendant's contacts with a particular
state are so substantial that it is predictable that the defendant
could be sued in that state on any claim arising anywhere in the
world. When a defendant chooses to engage in substantial activities
in a state, such as centering its corporate operations there, the
defendant might reasonably predict that those activities would
expose it to unlimited suits in that state. Lesser contacts, even
continuous ones, would not necessarily give the defendant this
appreciation. The defendant would not anticipate that a low level of
contacts with a state would expose it to suit there on any claim
arising elsewhere in the world. In order for general personal
jurisdiction to comport with the "orderly administration of laws," the
defendant must have such extensive contacts with the state that it
reasonably could anticipate or predict unlimited jurisdiction in the
state.
The third general fairness component is sovereignty. The Court
cited sovereignty as a primary concern underlying the purposeful
availment factor in both World-Wide Volkswagenl 25 and McIntyre.126
The key to sovereignty for general personal jurisdiction is that a
state has sovereignty both over activities within its borders and over
persons who are its "citizens" (in the broad, nontechnical sense of
the word).
The relatedness factor protects against a state exceeding its
sovereignty, perhaps more obviously than does the purposeful
availment standard. Relatedness helps ensure that the activity at
issue in the suit-that over which the state is asserting
124. Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1223 (11th Cir.
2009) ("[F]oreseeability constitutes a necessary ingredient of the relatedness
inquiry.").
125. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-93 (1980).
126. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).
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sovereignty-has some connection to the defendant's activity in the
forum state. A fair system would permit a state to assert
sovereignty, in the form of judicial jurisdiction, over activity
conducted within its borders or having an impact there. 127 By
contrast, the fact that a defendant once conducted isolated business
in the forum state would not give the state sovereignty over the
defendant's unrelated actions outside the state. 128
Similarly, sovereignty helps explain the extent of contacts
factor. A state not only has sovereignty over activities within its
borders, but it also has sovereignty over its persons or citizens, no
matter where they act. Citizenship in this sense is not necessarily
any literal definition used for other purposes, such as a federal
court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction. 1 29 Instead, the question
in this context is whether the defendant's contacts with the forum
state are so extensive that the state fairly may assert its sovereignty
over the person of the defendant, rather than the actions of the
defendant.
A fourth policy concern underlying the fairness of jurisdiction is
inconvenience. In the modern era, the Court used convenience as
shorthand in specific jurisdiction cases for the balance of the
defendant's burdens in litigating in the forum state against other
interests that might argue for jurisdiction, such as the plaintiff's
interests in the specific forum. 130 Convenience in the context of
general jurisdiction reflects somewhat different concerns. It is a
broad notion to help ensure the fairness of general jurisdiction by
helping define relatedness and extent of contacts.
One reason that jurisdiction over related claims is relatively
convenient is that the evidence concerning the claim is more likely
to be found in the forum state. On the other hand, when the claim is
unrelated, the evidentiary convenience is less, but other
conveniences emerge when the contacts are extensive. When the
defendant has extensive contacts with the state, the defendant will
127. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 3, at 86 ("[T]he most
convincing justification [for a related standard] is the State's right to regulate
activities occurring within the State.").
128. Id. (arguing that if a test of substantive relevance is adopted, then state
attempts at regulation of non-dispute-related activities "would be either
arbitrary and capricious or discriminatory").
129. Professor Brilmayer uses a variety of terms to connote this standard,
including "insider." Id. at 86-87.
130. See, e.g., McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that specific jurisdiction considers the "litigational convenience and
the respective situations of the parties" in order to "determine when it is
appropriate to subject a defendant to trial in the plaintiff's community"; Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985) (stating that preventing
great inconvenience to the defendant and providing the plaintiff with a
convenient forum in which to litigate his claims are both factors in establishing
specific jurisdiction).
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have little burden in traveling to and defending under that state's
legal system.
This statement of the convenience concern focuses solely on the
defendant's convenience or burdens. This is not to say that other
convenience concerns or interest factors-those under the second
prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen two-part test 131 -are entirely
irrelevant in setting general jurisdiction standards. For the most
part, the other concerns are either less apt in this context or
otherwise addressed. For example, on the extent of contacts factor,
because the claim is unrelated to the forum, the plaintiff has no
evidentiary interest in the forum. The plaintiff might have some
interests in the forum-for example, that she perceives the forum as
being favorable and otherwise convenient for her-but this interest
cannot itself determine jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be no
limits on jurisdiction. Instead, this interest properly is a secondary
concern that can influence jurisdictional standards when other
primary concerns are met.
In sum, these four fairness concerns help explain why the two
International Shoe factors are important, and they in turn inform
general jurisdiction analysis. The fairness concerns are not
themselves a jurisdictional test. They are not talismanic standards
that must be met in every case. They instead help guide analysis of
the many unanswered questions regarding general jurisdiction,
including the two major issues of the degree of relatedness and
extent and nature of contacts necessary for general jurisdiction
analysis.
III. RELATEDNESS OF CONTACTS AND CLAIMS-THE THRESHOLD
QUESTION
The biggest void in general jurisdiction analysis is the threshold
question of how to determine if a claim is fit for such analysis. In
other words, related claims are subject to the specific jurisdiction
two-part analysis set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen, and
unrelated claims are subject to general jurisdiction analysis. What
test should decide this essential fork in personal jurisdiction
analysis?
In International Shoe, the Court used several different terms to
describe relationship and lack of relationship: activities that "give
rise to" liabilities, as opposed to activities that are "unconnected,"
"unrelated," or "entirely distinct" from the claims. 132 Since then, the
Court has not defined the necessary degree of relationship,
reserving decision on the question. Lower courts and commentators
131. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
132. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945); see supra
notes 39-42 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18).
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have developed various tests for relatedness. Most of these tests
involve some element of causation, but some scholars propose a
standard that does not rely on causation and instead looks to
product or subject-matter similarity. As I explore below, both the
Court's precedent and policy analysis argue for a midlevel causation
test.
A. Possible Tests for Relatedness
In 1984, the Court in Helicol officially adopted the terminology
of general and specific jurisdiction, 133 but it reserved decision on the
essential question of how to differentiate the two forms of
jurisdiction. In reserving the decision, the Court highlighted three
potential issues: whether "arise out of' and "relate to" were
synonymous standards;134 the connection necessary to satisfy either
or both standards; 135 and whether a lesser connection than "arise
out of' would suffice for specific jurisdiction.13 6
Lower courts and scholars have attempted to answer these
questions. 13 7 At one time, the most prominent tests were those
developed in a line of vacation travel cases. Generally, in these
cases, the defendant, a business in the travel industry, reached into
the forum state, the plaintiffs home state, to entice the plaintiff to
travel to a distant location. The plaintiff was hurt in the distant
locale and sued the defendant in tort in the plaintiffs home state.
The question was whether the formalization of the vacation, such as
a ticket sale or reservation contract, in the plaintiffs home state,
was sufficiently related to the defendant's allegedly tortious conduct
in the vacation locale to support jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home
state. Some courts answered yes, and others no.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the conflict in the 1990 case Shute
v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.138 There, the plaintiffs were injured
on a cruise, several hundred miles from their Washington state
133. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 414 nn.8-9 (1985); see supra note 43 (noting adoption of the terminology).
134. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 415-16 n.10.
137. Some judicial opinions addressing relatedness are in the context of the
local long-arm statute, but these inquiries usually, though not always, merge
into the constitutional issue of relatedness. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs.,
Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 713-14 (1st Cir. 1996) (addressing whether the court's prior
opinions were constructions of long-arm statutory or constitutional
requirements of relatedness); infra notes 223-27 (discussing Nowak, 94 F.3d at
711, 716).
138. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585




home, and they sued the cruise company in their home state.13 9 The
plaintiffs bought their cruise ticket in Washington. The defendant
had advertised and sold cruise tickets to other Washington
residents, amounting to 1.29% of its total cruise ticket sales. 140
Because these other sales were not sufficient contacts for general
jurisdiction,141 the court explored whether the connection between
the ticket sale and the cruise injury claims was sufficient for specific
jurisdiction. If it were, then jurisdiction likely would be proper,
given that the defendant knowingly sent the ticket to the plaintiffs
in Washington and met the purposeful availment factor.142 Thus,
the relatedness issue was essential to whether a court in
Washington properly could assert jurisdiction over the cruise line on
this claim.
The Ninth Circuit observed that some other circuits, including
the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits, then used a strict test, often
called "proximate cause," to reject jurisdiction in vacation travel
cases.143 Under this strict test, the personal injury tort claim was
not sufficiently related to the defendant's forum activities because
proof of the claim depended on the defendant's wrongful actions in
the vacation locale, not the advertisements or ticket sales in the
forum. 14 4 Perhaps a breach of contract or misrepresentation claim
would be sufficiently related under this test but not the personal
injury claim. In other words, the personal injury tort plaintiff would
not be able to rely on any of the defendant's forum activities to
establish her claim.
The Ninth Circuit in Shute also surveyed vacation travel cases
applying a less stringent "but-for" test.145 The court concluded that
the but-for test was the better test because the proximate cause test
was not necessary to protect defendants and was too restrictive of
plaintiffs' forum choices.146  It held that the ticket sale in
Washington was sufficiently related to the plaintiffs personal injury
claim: without the ticket the plaintiff never would have taken the
cruise where she was injured. 147 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,148 and although it
139. Shute, 897 F.2d. at 379.
140. Id. at 381; see infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing this aspect of the extent of
contacts factor).
141. Shute, 897 F.2d at 380-81.
142. Id. at 381-83.
143. Id. at 383.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 385-86.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 386.
148. 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991).
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heard argument on the relatedness issue, 149 the Court avoided the
constitutional question of relatedness by relying on a forum
selection clause printed on the back of the cruise ticket.150
The question of the proper relatedness standard, of course,
extends beyond the vacation cases. The First Circuit, for example,
has announced a test for relatedness in contract suits, under which
courts "look to the elements of the cause of action and ask whether
the defendant's contacts with the forum were instrumental either in
the formation of the contract or its breach." 51 The Federal Circuit
has announced a "flexibl[e]" "disjunctive" test for patent cases-
requiring that the claim either "arise out of' or "relate" to the
defendant's forum state activities. 152 Under this test, the Federal
Circuit has held that forum manufacture, sale, and use of an
offending product are all related to a patent infringement claim, but
are not sufficiently related to a patent declaratory unenforceability
action. 153
Academics have pondered the proper test. Professor Brilmayer
has long advocated a "substantive relevance" test.154 Under her test,
a claim is related if "the applicable rules of law actually make the
contact in question one of substantive relevance,"155 or, put another
way, "if the forum occurrence ... would ordinarily be alleged as part
of a comparable domestic complaint."156 Her test is similar to the
proximate cause test, and courts have categorized the two tests as
one. 157
A few commentators' 5 8 and courts' 59 have advocated liberal
tests that do not include any form of causation. These tests have
149. See Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 2-
11, 22-36, Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (No. 89-1647), 1991 WL 636293,
at *3-11, *22-26 (oral argument concerning relationship issue).
150. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589 ("Because we find the forum-selection
clause to be dispositive of this question, we need not consider [the relatedness
issue].").
151. Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289
(1st Cir. 1999).
152. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1330, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (2001))
(internal citations omitted).
153. Id. at 1336.
154. See generally Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 3; Brilmayer,
Related Contacts, supra note 3.
155. Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1455.
156. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 3, at 82.
157. See, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 333 (D.C.
2000) (en banc) ("These tests have sometimes been described as one test:
substantive relevance/proximate cause."); see also Maloney, supra note 5, at
1282-83 (characterizing the proximate cause and substantive relevance tests as
the same).
158. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 5, at 886-90 (proposing a three-prong test
for general jurisdiction that would ask first whether the defendant's forum
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various names, but, generally speaking, they would apply specific
jurisdiction analysis so long as there is a minimal relationship
between the contacts and the claim.160 Some of these tests could be
described generally as requiring a topical or subject similarity.
Professor Twitchell, for example, advocated a similarity test that
would apply specific personal jurisdiction analysis when the
"defendant's forum contact is similar to, but not causally related to,
the conduct that forms the basis for the cause of action." 161
In products liability cases, a similarity test would find sufficient
relatedness so long as the defendant sold, in the forum state, a
product similar to that at issue in the suit. 162 That the forum sales
had no causal relationship to the plaintiffs claim would not defeat
relatedness. By contrast, an entirely unconnected claim, such as an
employment contract or discrimination suit by an employee in the
defendant's headquarters, likely would not be sufficiently related to
the defendant's product sales in the forum state under this test.
A similarity test arguably might align with that proposed by
Justice Brennan in Helicol. There, although the Court majority did
not address relatedness, Justice Brennan refused to concede lack of
relationship. He rejected a formal "arise out of" test and agreed that
the claims there "did not formally 'arise out of [the defendant's]
specific activities' in Texas. 163 He argued that the claims at issue
were otherwise related, and in doing so, he used terms such as not
"wholly unrelated"164 and "significantly related."165
B. The Invalidity of a Broad Noncausation Test for Relatedness
Both the Supreme Court's precedent and the policies underlying
general jurisdiction analysis point to a causation test. Although the
Court has not settled the question of relatedness, a close
examination of the cases suggests that the Court rejects a
activities are analogous to the in-state activities of a forum domiciliary); Rose,
supra note 5, at 1589 (arguing for a substantive relevance test with two
exceptions, including a similarity test in product cases); Simard, Hybrid
Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 599 (arguing that jurisdiction should exist if the
defendant has forum contacts that are similar to those underlying the plaintiffs
claim).
159. See Moreno, 746 A.2d at 334-35 (surveying cases applying broad,
noncausation tests).
160. See O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2007)
(noting that noncausation tests require a "substantial connection" or
"discernible relationship" between the contacts and the claim, but, "[uinlike the
but-for test, causation is of no special importance").
161. Twitchell, Myth, supra note 4, at 660.
162. Id. at 660-61.
163. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 425 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
164. Id. at 426.
165. Id. at 425.
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noncausation standard. Likewise, the four fairness policies argue
for a causation test.
1. The Court's Precedent on Noncausation Relatedness
Most of the Court's jurisdiction cases are specific jurisdiction
cases. These cases necessarily involve related contacts. Yet, in
these cases, the Court rarely mentions relatedness, let alone the
distinctions between causation and noncausation tests for
relatedness. Most of the Court's specific jurisdiction cases are "easy"
in terms of relatedness because the claims arguably satisfy even
strict causation tests. I discuss these cases in more detail below; 166
my point here is that the Court's specific jurisdiction cases leave
open whether a lesser form of noncausation relatedness would
suffice.
Some observers cite World-Wide Volkswagen as supporting a
similarity test.167 They do not base this argument on the plaintiffs
actual claim against the dealer, likely because the plaintiff suffered
injury in the forum state of Oklahoma and her claim would satisfy
most causation tests for relatedness. 16 8 Instead, the argument for a
noncausation similarity test builds on the Court's dictum regarding
Audi, the car's manufacturer. The Court stated:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer ... such as
Audi ... is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer . .. to serve directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those states if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or to others." 16 9
The dictum is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the dictum may be an explanation why the
Oklahoma court in the actual case would have had jurisdiction over
Audi, if it had objected to jurisdiction.17 0 If this is a correct reading,
the dictum would suggest a liberal test of relationship, under which
similarity in product sales would be enough. 171 In other words,
Audi's marketing and sales of similar cars in Oklahoma would be
sufficiently related to plaintiffs' claims to justify suit against Audi
166. See infra Part III.C.1.
167. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 4, at 661 (arguing that jurisdiction over
Audi in World- Wide Volkswagen was justified on product similarity, not extent
of contacts).
168. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980);
see infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the role of injury under relatedness tests).
169. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
170. Audi did not contest jurisdiction. Id. at 288 n.3.
171. This hypothetical presents a question under a hybrid theory, which I
discuss infra Part IV.D.
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there, even though the plaintiffs bought the actual car elsewhere
without regard to any of Audi's marketing in Oklahoma. On the
other hand, the Court's dictum may suggest only that Audi would be
subject to jurisdiction if its marketing reached an Oklahoma
consumer (as opposed to the actual New York plaintiffs) and
motivated that Oklahoma consumer to buy the car, which later
caused injury in Oklahoma. This latter interpretation suggests a
causal test for relationship. The sale and the later injury would not
have occurred but for Audi's marketing in Oklahoma.
The Court's cases outside of the specific jurisdiction context are
more informative on the relatedness question. The Court seemingly
rejected a broad similarity standard in Shaffer v. Heitner,172 a case
in which the Court described relatedness as a key concern. There,
the Court held that in-state property by itself was no longer an
independent basis for personal jurisdiction and that "all assertions
of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."173 The
Court noted that, under Pennoyer, property could support personal
jurisdiction even if the property was "completely unrelated to the
plaintiffs cause of action."174 By contrast, the Court explained in
Shaffer that relatedness was "central" under International Shoe:
"[T]he central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction"
involves "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation."175 According to the Court, the defendant's forum state
property is a relevant contact under the minimum contacts test, but
the problem is that the property contact is unrelated to the claim. 76
The Court in Shaffer did not adopt a particular test for
relationship, but it did state that the property at issue in the case
before it was not sufficiently related. Shaffer was a shareholder's
derivative action, filed in Delaware state court, that alleged
wrongdoing committed by the defendant officers and directors in
Oregon.177 The property used to support jurisdiction over most of
the individual defendants was their Greyhound stock.178 There was
172. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
173. Id. at 212.
174. Id. at 209; see supra Part L.A (discussing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
overruled in part by Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186).
175. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
176. Id. at 207-09.
177. Id. at 189-90. The action charged that the defendants violated their
duties to Greyhound by causing the company to be held liable for civil damages
in excess of $13 million and a large criminal fine in antitrust suits. Id. at 190 &
n.2.
178. Id. at 191-92. Delaware law provided that Delaware was the physical
location of stock issued by Delaware corporations and that shares of stock could




a form of subject-matter relationship between the defendants' stock
and the claim: both involved the Greyhound Corporation. The
defendants' stock holdings were more related to the suit than other
property that the corporate executives might have owned in
Delaware, such as a vacation home. This minimal relationship was
not enough for the Court, which stated that the defendants'
Greyhound stock was "not the subject-matter of [the] litigation, nor
[was] the underlying cause of action related to the property."179
The Court's general jurisdiction cases also seem to reject a
standard based solely on similarity. In Perkins, the Court
summarily stated, without analysis of the question, that the "cause
of action. . . did not arise in Ohio and does not relate to the
corporation's activities there."180 This sentence is ambiguous. It
uses both "arise" and "relate to" to describe the lack of connection
that triggered general jurisdiction analysis. The facts of the case,
however, suggest that the necessary relatedness was something
more than topical or subject similarity.
In Perkins, the plaintiff sought dividends and damages due to
the defendant's failure to issue certificates for her stock.181 These
corporate governance failures had a subject-matter similarity to the
defendant corporation's Ohio activities. 182 At the time of the suit,
Ohio was the center of corporate operations, which included
meetings of the board, maintenance of bank accounts, and stock
transfer decisions. 18 3  Yet, the Court stated that there was an
insufficient relationship between these Ohio activities and the
claim.184 Therefore, the Court seemingly viewed relatedness as
connoting something more than mere subject similarity.
In Helicol, a majority of the Court reserved decision on
relatedness, but even Justice Brennan's opinion did not necessitate
a test as liberal as noncausal similarity.85 To be sure, he suggested
a broad test when he stated that the contacts were "not wholly
unrelated" to the claim,186 but the facts of the case did not
necessitate such a test in order to find relatedness. The claim in
Helicol might have satisfied a but-for test. The defendant
negotiated in Texas the very charter service that led to the deaths
179. Id. at 213.
180. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952).
181. Id. at 439.
182. See Borchers, supra note 5, at 124 (describing Perkins and stating that
"one can now easily imagine an argument that the corporation's Ohio
activity . . . as related to the claims in the case").
183. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
184. Id. at 448-49.
185. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
186. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 426 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that were at issue in the wrongful death suits.187 The plaintiffs
could have argued, as in the vacation travel cases, that but for the
defendant's Texas activities, the plaintiffs' husbands would not have
died in the Peru helicopter crash. Moreover, although Justice
Brennan rejected an "arise out of' test, he suggested a form of
substantive relevance test by arguing that the actual claims
concerned, in part, the pilot's negligence, which might have been
due to improper training in Texas.188
In 2011, the Court in Goodyear came close to ending any debate
on product similarity as the test for relatedness. The Court
summarily stated that the claim there was unrelated: "Because the
episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France, and the tire
alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold
abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction."189 The
case was not sufficiently related even though the claim concerned
tires and the defendants sold tires in North Carolina. This would
suggest that the Court did not consider mere product similarity to
be a sufficient relationship to trigger specific personal jurisdiction
analysis.190
Yet, on this issue, the Court left the door open, by just a crack.
Elsewhere in the opinion, when discussing the question of the
necessary extent of the defendants' contacts, the Court mentioned
that the defendants did not sell the same type of tire in North
Carolina as that involved in the bus accident.19' This point,
perhaps, suggests that a product similarity might be sufficient if it
is a very close similarity. This, of course, begs the question of how
similar the product must be. Professor Brilmayer recognized this
"tricky question" raised by a similarity test. 192 She pondered not
only the degree of similarity of the product itself-make, model, and
year, for example-but also the similarity of the alleged product
187. Id. at 410-11 (majority opinion); see also id. at 426 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "negotiations that took place in Texas led to the
contract in which Helicol agreed to provide the precise transportation services
that were begin used at the time of the crash").
188. Id. at 426 ("[T]he helicopter involved in the crash was purchased by
Helicol in Texas, and the pilot whose negligence was alleged to have caused the
crash was actually trained in Texas.").
189. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011).
190. See Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, No. 11-50097,
2012 WL 2948543, at *11-12 (5th Cir. July 20, 2012) (rejecting personal
jurisdiction based on the defendant's website sales to other forum consumers).
191. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852 ("[Tihe type of tire involved in the
accident ... was never distributed in North Carolina" and defendants instead
sold in North Carolina "typically custom ordered to equip specialty vehicles
such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse trailers.").
192. Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1460.
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defect. 193 These implementation issues alone might argue against
any form of "close similarity" test.
2. A Policy Assessment of Noncausation Relatedness
A broader policy analysis argues against a noncausation
similarity test. In addition to the practical implementation
problems, the four fairness components argue against any form of a
noncausation test. Product cases are good examples to test and
illustrate this policy analysis.
First, the benefits and burdens of entering a state would not be
reciprocal. In a product case, a similarity test would expose the
seller to all product suits in any state in which it sells a similar
product, regardless of the extent of sales in that state. This is not
an entirely unlimited burden, in that the test would not support
suits that have no connection at all, such as an employment action,
but it would be a severe burden, in the form of broad jurisdiction
over all product sales. The burden would exceed most benefits from
forum state sales. Indeed, if mere product similarity were the test,
specific jurisdiction could be founded on a single forum sale of a
similar product to another customer, so long as that other sale was
purposeful.
Second, a similarity test also fails to give claim-specific
predictability. The defendant does not have an adequate basis on
which to predict its amenability to suit as result of product sales.
Even a single sale in the forum state would subject the defendant to
jurisdiction there on product claims arising from sales that took
place anywhere in the world. The Court recognized this potential
reach in Goodyear, when it warned that under a "sprawling view of
general jurisdiction . .. any substantial manufacturer or seller of
goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for relief, wherever
its products are distributed." 194 Although this statement was in the
context of the other general jurisdiction factor-extent of contacts-
its warning applies equally to the question of relatedness.
Here, the purposeful availment standard by itself would not
adequately protect predictability because the defendant would not
appreciate the claims to which its actions subjected it to jurisdiction.
Where the defendant deliberately targeted sales to the forum, the
purposeful availment standard is met as to those targeted sales, but
that finding does not resolve predictability concerns for the
defendant's other sales outside the forum state. In these
hypothetical product cases, the defendant's only connection to the
current suit is that he deliberately sold a similar product in the
forum state. That lone sale would not give him any basis on which
193. Id. at 1459-60.
194. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.
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to predict suits by persons other than that single consumer. In
other words, the defendant reasonably could anticipate suit on this
sale by this consumer, but that appreciation does not mean that the
defendant could anticipate all other products suits by other
consumers, no matter where they bought their similar product.
There would be no claim-specific predictability.
Third, the forum state exceeds its sovereignty when it asserts
jurisdiction over claims that are merely similar to activities within
its borders, as opposed to causally connected to the forum conduct.
The state may have an interest in regulating the safety of similar
products sold within its borders, but its sovereignty should not
extend to products sold and causing injury outside its borders.
Otherwise, a state would be justified in reaching out to any activity
committed anywhere, based solely on the fact that a similar act was
committed within its border. 95
Finally, convenience does not argue strongly for jurisdiction
based solely on product similarity, as opposed to a causal link.196
The defendant's burden of travel may not be great, given its earlier
ability to sell products in the state, but presumably the case would
have no evidentiary advantage. Neither the claim-related evidence
nor the defendant-related evidence would be located in the state.
In sum, a relatedness standard based on similarity, as opposed
to some form of causation, is not the proper test. It does not have
support in the Court's jurisdiction precedent, and a policy analysis
argues against it. In practice, rejection of this standard will work
little change. The First Circuit summarized the prevailing view in
1996: "Most courts share [an] emphasis on causation, but differ over
the proper causative threshold. Generally courts have gravitated
toward one of two familiar tort concepts-'but for' or 'proximate
cause."197 Few courts have applied a similarity test of a single sale
in its pure form, in that they typically do not base jurisdiction solely
on similarity without regard to at least an intermediate level of
195. Cf. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) (invalidating a
punitive damages award that punished extraterritorial conduct that was lawful
where it occurred and did not harm forum citizens).
196. See Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1461 (arguing that a
similarity test would not promote "either litigational or party convenience").
197. Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1996); see
infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text (discussing Nowak, 94 F.3d at 711,
716); see also Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008)
("[Ilt is not enough that there be some similarity between the activities that
connect the defendant to the forum and the plaintiffs claim."); Seymour v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that a New
Hampshire court could not assert jurisdiction over a drug maker in a product
liability claim brought by a Massachusetts consumer of drugs purchased in
Massachusetts, even though the defendant advertised and solicited orders for
the same drug in New Hampshire).
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forum activities. I discuss this blended form of jurisdiction below in
Part IV.E.
C. The Proper Causation Test for Relatedness
That mere similarity is not an adequate test for relatedness
does not solve the issue. It leaves the question of the proper
causation test. The lower courts use different tests with many
labels, all requiring some sort of causal connection between the
claim and the defendant's forum contacts. I contend that the proper
causation test is a midlevel causation test, perhaps best described as
"meaningful link." The terminology, however, is not as important or
as instructive as the proper application of the test.
1. Causation Relatedness in the Court's Specific Jurisdiction
Cases
A useful first step is to ask what sort of connection was enough
in the Court's specific jurisdiction cases. These cases necessarily
involve related claims, and although the Court rarely mentioned the
question of relatedness, the facts of the cases may suggest a pattern
or test for relatedness. The common element in these cases is
injury. In virtually all of the Court's specific jurisdiction cases, the
plaintiff suffered all or part of her injury in the forum state.
The easiest cases in which to locate injury are the product
liability cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs were
injured in a car accident while driving in Oklahoma. 198 In Asahi,
the primary plaintiff was injured in California, and the third-party
indemnity plaintiff incurred damages in California in the form of
defense costs and settlement funds. 199 In McIntyre, the plaintiff was
injured at work in New Jersey.200 Even in the Court's other cases,
those involving intangible injury and economic loss, some injury
occurred in the forum state. In two defamation cases-Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.201 and Calder v. JoneS202-the Court
recognized that the plaintiff incurred at least some reputational
injury in the forum state. In Burger King, a breach of contract and
trademark case, the Court noted that the plaintiff, Burger King,
suffered injury in the forum state.203
198. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
199. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1987).
200. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
201. 465 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1984).
202. 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
203. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985) ("[Tlhe
defendant's refusal to make the contractually required payment in Miami, and
his continued use of Burger King's trademarks and confidential business
information after his termination, caused foreseeable injury to the corporation
in Florida.").
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Several insights can be drawn from this role of the place of
injury. First, forum state injury satisfies the Court's conception of
relatedness. 204 Although some interpretations of the strict tests
suggest that injury alone may not suffice-under a theory that a
wrongful act must occur in the forum state205-this view is incorrect.
Unlike causation in tort cases, the causation tests for jurisdictional
relatedness do not necessarily look for the cause of the injury. These
tests in essence look to the cause of the claim. The claim arises out
of the injury. The injury is an essential element of the claim. 2 0 6
Second, a corollary of the first, the underlying wrongful conduct
need not occur inside the forum. In all of the listed cases, all or part
of the defendant's allegedly wrongful actions occurred in states other
than the forum state. In World-Wide Volkswagen, for example, the
dealer's alleged wrongful act-the sale of the car-occurred in New
York, not Oklahoma. This means that relatedness does not require
that all elements of the claim occur in the forum state. Indeed, most
articulations of even the stricter tests, such as the substantive
relevance test, require that only one of the operative elements occur
in the forum state.207
Third, although the Court's specific jurisdiction cases were
brought in the state of injury, place of injury is not the sole standard
for relatedness. The place of the defendant's wrongful conduct also
is a related contact. The wrongful act is a proximate cause of the
claim or is at least substantively relevant to the claim. In Goodyear,
the Court phrased the place of wrong as an alternative when it
stated that the case was one of general jurisdiction because neither
the injury nor the manufacture-sale of the tire occurred in North
Carolina.208
Finally, the Court's specific jurisdiction cases demonstrate the
difference between the predictability underlying the relatedness
204. Justice Ginsburg in McIntyre stated that "the State in which the injury
occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort
claim." McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That the claim
is related does not mean that the place of injury is a permissible forum. The
case must pass the purposeful availment test.
205. Cf. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir.
1990) (pondering whether the proximate cause test would "compel the
conclusion that [product] claims arise from negligence in manufacturing and
design, rather than from forum-related activity"), rev'd on other grounds 499
U.S. 585 (1991); see also supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text (discussing
Shute, 897 F.2d 377).
206. See Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1453-58 (listing
injury as a substantively relevant event).
207. Id. (describing application of the substantive relevance test and
emphasizing that it is met by the occurrence of a single event).
208. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851




standard and that underlying the purposeful availment standard.
The place of injury, when divorced from the underlying wrongful
conduct, as it is in most product cases, is unpredictable. Yet, injury
was enough to trigger specific jurisdiction analysis in the Court's
product cases. The explanation is that the relatedness standard
promotes claim-specific predictability while the purposeful
availment standard protects forum predictability. In other words, in
a product case, the relatedness standard gives predictability as to
the types of claims subject to specific jurisdiction, and the
purposeful availment ensures that the defendant appreciate the
location.
In a product case, where a plaintiff chooses to file suit in the
state in which the defendant manufactured the product, the
defendant gains both claim-specific and forum-specific knowledge
when it commits the act of manufacture. In cases where injury
occurs in a state different from manufacture, the relatedness
requirement ensures the claim-specific knowledge-claims arising
from that injury, as opposed to claims not related to that injury-
and the purposeful availment standard ensures that the defendant
knowingly sought out that particular forum. Together, they ensure
that the defendant has sufficient appreciation and notice of the
jurisdictional consequences of his actions.
By contrast, a broad similarity test for relatedness would not
give sufficient claim-specific predictability, and the purposeful
availment standard would not fill the void. Purposeful availment
analysis would ask if this forum contact was purposeful, and the
answer often would be yes. The defendant purposefully sold similar
products in the forum state. The purposeful availment standard
ensures that the defendant knows that he made contact with a
particular state, but in this context, it does not tell him the
jurisdictional consequences of his contact. The purposeful availment
standard, acting alone, would not give sufficient predictability.
Relatedness, by contrast, can fill the void and give claim-specific
predictability.
2. The But-For, Proximate Cause, and Meaningful Lin-k
Causation Tests
Because the Court's specific jurisdiction cases all have fact
patterns in which a key element of the claim-the injury-occurred
in the forum state, they leave open whether that element is
necessary or whether a lesser form of connection also would pass
constitutional muster. The lower courts have used a wide variety of
terms to describe the possible causation tests. The terminology
often confuses the issue. Yet, some common elements can be found.
First, the but-for test, if unrestrained, is too broad. This test
asks whether, "but for" the defendant's forum state contacts, the
underlying events of the plaintiffs claim would have occurred. A
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hypothetical based on International Shoe demonstrates its potential
reach. A Washington state consumer wants to bring a products suit
against the International Shoe company in Colorado based on the
fact that the company sent shoe crates on a train, which started in
St. Louis and traveled through Colorado on its way to Seattle. In a
broad sense there is some historical connection: but for the train
ride through Colorado, the plaintiff never would have received her
shoes and been injured by them. 209
Such an unrestrained but-for test would fail a policy analysis,
for many of the same reasons that a similarity test fails. Carried to
its extremes, such a test would not achieve reciprocity. Using the
train hypothetical, the company enjoyed benefits from Colorado by
sending its product through the state. The jurisdictional burden of
defending in Colorado, however, would not be reciprocal to that
benefit. The jurisdictional burden would extend to all products the
company ever sent on a train through Colorado, no matter where the
products were sold or caused injury.210
By the same token, the company could not predict the types of
claims as to which it would be amenable to suit in Colorado. The
company would have claim-specific predictability as to suits directly
arising from an event in Colorado-a negligence suit alleging that
the shoe company improperly loaded a box car that caused injury in
Colorado. But that would not extend to any and all claims
concerning any product that the company ever sent by train through
Colorado.
Colorado would have sovereignty over the activities within its
borders if, for example, the product caused injury while on the train
in Colorado, but Colorado has no sovereignty on the products once
they leave its borders without causing any harm in Colorado.
Finally, convenience would not be served because there would be no
evidentiary connection between Colorado and the claim of defective
manufacture in Missouri and injury in Washington.
Few, if any, observers would endorse an unrestrained but-for
test. The First Circuit rejected a pure but-for test, explaining that it
had "no limiting principle" and encompassed "every event that
209. Professor Brilmayer gave the example of a car accident case in which
the defendant's act of driving through the forum state is a but-for cause, even
though the trip originated elsewhere and the accident occurred in another state.
Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at 1445-46; see Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count, supra note 3, at 83-84 (California case variation). Professor
Brilmayer still argues that but-for causation is not a proper jurisdictional test.
See Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 8, at 628 (noting the "undesirable
consequence" of "causality in the strict, but-for sense").
210. uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 430 (7th Cir. 2010)
(arguing that but-for causation would be "vastly overinclusive" and that the
"tacit quid pro quo would break down").
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hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain."21' Even the
Ninth Circuit, which adopted the but-for test in Shute,212 recognized
that the test could be too broad. It elected to remedy any case of a
"too attenuated" connection through the reasonableness prong of the
World-Wide Volkswagen test, as opposed to a "restrictive" reading of
the relatedness standard.213
On the other end of the causation spectrum is the proximate
cause test. It can be pushed too far in the other direction. In strict
applications, the test would find insufficient relatedness simply
because the defendant's forum contacts are contractual and the
plaintiffs claim is based in tort. Even the First Circuit, once "the
main proponent of the proximate cause standard," concluded that
"strict adherence to a proximate cause standard in all circumstances
is unnecessarily restrictive."214
Whatever the terminology, many (but not all) courts seem to be
moving toward the center. This is best seen in the vacation travel
cases. As noted in Shute, at one time, the circuit courts were
markedly split in their holdings in these cases. 2 15 Today, the test
terminology still differs, and the holdings sometimes differ, but the
differences usually are more attributable to factual variations than
to the nature of the relatedness test.
The vacation travel cases are good illustrations because they
have an intermediate connection between the claim and the
defendant's forum state contacts. The defendant formalized the
transaction, through a ticket sale or booked reservation, in the
plaintiffs home state. The defendant did not merely advertise its
cruise ship or resort in the forum state; it acted specifically with
regard to this plaintiff in his home state and formalized a business
relationship in that state, the forum state.
The Third Circuit in O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co. found
relatedness in a vacation case, under what it described as a
"meaningful link" standard.216 There, a resort in Barbados engaged
the plaintiff in his home state of Pennsylvania and there formed a
211. Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d. 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 407 (5th ed. 2010) (arguing that the "'but
for' test is so potentially broad as to collapse the distinction between specific
and general jurisdiction" and the "mere fact that the contact ultimately led to
other events that produced the dispute . . . is not sufficient to qualify it as
related").
212. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
213. Id.
214. Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715.
215. Shute, 897 F.2d at 383-85; see supra notes 143-47 (discussing the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of other circuits'approaches).
216. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 324 (3d Cir. 2007).
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contract for spa services in Barbados. 217 The court permitted
jurisdiction over the resort in Pennsylvania on the plaintiffs claim
that the resort had negligently injured him in performing the spa
treatments.218 The court emphasized the policies of predictability
and reciprocity:
With each purposeful contact by an out-of-state resident, the
forum state's laws will extend certain benefits and impose
certain obligations. . . . Specific jurisdiction is the cost of
enjoying the benefits. . . . The relatedness requirement's
function is to maintain balance in this reciprocal exchange. In
order to do so, it must keep the jurisdictional exposure that
results from a contact closely tailored to that contact's
accompanying substantive obligations. The causal connection
can be somewhat lower than the tort concept of proximate
causation . . . but it must nonetheless be intimate enough to
keep the quid pro quo proportional and personal jurisdiction
reasonably foreseeable. 219
The Third Circuit disclaimed use of a proximate cause standard:
"Our relatedness analysis . . . requires neither proximate causation
nor substantive relevance. . .. It is enough that a meaningful link
exists between a legal obligation that arose in the forum and the
substance of the plaintiffs' claims."2 2 0 On the other hand, it used
but-for causation as only an initial screen. 221 The spa reservation
was not only a but-for cause of the later spa injury, but, the court
emphasized, it also created duties of reasonable care and was
therefore a "meaningful link" between the defendant's forum contact
and the claim. 222
Other courts have used this "meaningful link" phrasing. A key
case is Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd.,2 23 in which the First
Circuit, a former proponent of the "proximate cause" test,2 2 4 relaxed
its standard somewhat in a vacation case. There, the defendant
operated a hotel in Hong Kong, and the plaintiffs wife drowned in
the hotel pool. 22 5 The plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, sued the
217. Id. at 315-16.
218. Id. at 323-25.
219. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 322 (noting that the but-for test "at least makes an attempt to
preserve the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction" and "provides
a useful starting point for the relatedness inquiry").
222. Id. at 323-24 (noting that the defendant, through its Pennsylvania
contacts, formed a contact for spa services and "acquired certain rights" and
"accompanying obligations").
223. 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1996).
224. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 383 (1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); supra note 211.
225. Nowak, 94 F.3d at 711.
[Vol. 471042
GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
hotel in Massachusetts. The defendant hotel had solicited the long-
term business of the plaintiffs Massachusetts employer. 226 The
defendant negotiated a contract in Massachusetts, under which the
employer agreed to make the defendant hotel the exclusive hotel for
its employees when traveling to Hong Kong. The First Circuit
concluded that these Massachusetts contacts were sufficiently
related to the plaintiffs wrongful death claim: "While the nexus
between [the defendant's] solicitation of [the employer's] business
and Mrs. Nowak's death does not constitute a proximate cause
relationship, it does represent a meaningful link."22 7
This is the correct result. An intermediate, "meaningful link"
test is consistent with the four fairness components when applied to
vacation travel cases. First, reciprocity is met.2 2 8 When an out-of-
state travel destination, such as a hotel, makes formal
arrangements with a forum state resident in the forum state, the
hotel enjoys benefits from the forum state. The hotel both solicited
and secured business in the forum state. That the injury and literal
cause of the injury occurred elsewhere does not remove the hotel's
forum state benefit. Jurisdiction in the forum on the injury claim
would be proportional to the benefits received from the forum.
Likewise, jurisdiction is sufficiently predictable. When a hotel
knowingly engages a forum state resident in the forum state, the
hotel can reasonably anticipate that it might be subject to suit on
any claim arising out of that business relationship. The plaintiffs
subsequent injury at the hotel is a foreseeable incident of that
business relationship. That the relationship in the forum state is
contractual in nature, rather than tort, does not affect the
foreseeability of the injury that might arise out of the business
relationship. 22 9
Application of the sovereignty concern is more difficult. The
forum state arguably has some sovereignty over the claim because
the business relationship began in the forum. Yet, the sovereignty
226. Id.
227. Id. at 716.
228. See O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 323-24 (3d Cir.
2007) (discussing "the reciprocity principle" of the meaningful link test).
229. The Ninth Circuit rejected a tort-contract distinction in Shute:
Logically, there is no reason why a tort cannot grow out of a
contractual contact. In a case like this, a contractual contact is a "but
for" causative factor for the tort since it brought the parties within
tortuous "striking distance" of one another. While the relationship
between a tort suit and a contractual contract is certainly more
tenuous than when a tort suit arises from a tort contact, that only
goes to whether the contact is by itself sufficient for due process, not
whether the suit arises from the contract.
Shute, 897 F.2d at 385 (citing Prejean v. Sonatrech Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270
n.21 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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argument underlying relatedness focuses primarily on the state
having sovereignty over activities that occur in its borders, and the
underlying wrongful acts in the typical vacation case occurred
outside the forum state. But the same argument could be made in
any case in which only injury occurs in the forum state. If a state's
sovereignty were limited to the actual wrongful actions, injury
would not be enough. To be sure, injury is a more significant
element than the formalization of the initial business relationship,
but the state arguably has sovereignty going forward from the
initial formalization, just as it does going backwards from the
injury.
Convenience is mixed, at least when viewed solely from the
perspective of the defendant. The initial contact and ticket sale or
reservation would not be critical items of evidence. Indeed, for the
defendant, little, if any, evidence would be located in the forum
state. Some evidence regarding the plaintiff himself, presumably
some of his postinjury evidence, would be in the forum state if it
were the plaintiffs home state. The plaintiff personally would find
it more convenient to litigate there. Nevertheless, on balance, the
four fairness concerns are adequately served, and an intermediate
causation test would be fair to the defendant.
Not all courts have moved to the middle ground in the vacation
cases, and some still deny specific jurisdiction. 230 Oldfield v. Pueblo
De Bahia a Lora, S.A. 2 3 1 is a recent example. There, the plaintiff,
from his home in Florida, booked a room reservation and charter
fishing trip with a resort in Costa Rica. 23 2 The plaintiff was injured
on the fishing trip in Costa Rica and sued the resort in Florida,
alleging vicarious liability for the charter boat captain's
negligence. 233  The Eleventh Circuit held that the reservation
contact was too "tenuous" to provide foreseeability and therefore was
not sufficiently related to the plaintiffs negligence claims.234 This is
too narrow a reading of foreseeability and relatedness.
The Eleventh Circuit relied at least in part on the fact that the
fishing captain was not an employee of the resort.235 That reliance
is misplaced. Whether the resort was legally responsible for the
boat captain's actions was a question of liability, not jurisdiction.
The relevant point for jurisdictional analysis was the plaintiffs
allegation that the resort was legally responsible, in part due to the
resort's exchanges with the plaintiff in Florida regarding the
230. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 & n.7 (describing cases that apply "a
purer, more rigid" version of the proximate cause test).
231. 558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
232. Id. at 1214.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1223.
235. Id. at 1223-24.
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chartering of the boat. The jurisdictional question is whether that
exchange, which occurred in the forum state of Florida, was
sufficiently related to the plaintiffs claim for the resort to be legally
responsible for the captain's negligence. The answer should be yes.
Indeed, the contact likely would be substantively relevant in that
the plaintiff almost certainly would rely upon the resort's booking of
the charter trip to support his claim that the resort is responsible for
the fishing captain's negligence. The charter reservation may not be
a technical element of the claim, but it is a but-for cause that has a
relevant and meaningful connection to the plaintiffs claim.
The problem with a too-strict test is not fairness to the
defendant. It would not be unfair to the defendant to insulate it
from jurisdiction under a strict test. The problem instead is that a
strict relatedness standard unnecessarily limits the plaintiffs forum
choice. In cases where a relatedness test, such as a similarity test,
would not comport with the four fairness rationales, the fact that
the plaintiff would find the forum desirable or convenient does not
argue for a finding of relatedness. However, where an intermediate
relatedness standard adequately serves the four fairness concerns, a
stricter test is not necessary. The concern for the plaintiff and
available forums now would come into play and argue for the
intermediate test, as opposed to a stricter test. In this sense, these
other interests-those of the plaintiff-play a role similar to that in
the second prong of the World- Wide Volkswagen test.236
Thus, an intermediate, meaningful link test is the better test.
The question of how to apply a meaningful link test necessarily will
require case-by-case development, similar to that of the purposeful
availment standard. The foregoing analysis, however, offers some
parameters. First, if the forum state contact constitutes a
substantive element of the claim-injury or wrongful act-
relatedness always will be met. Second, but-for causation is
essential but not sufficient. For all cases in between, the four
fairness factors will guide application of the standard to test
whether the claim is sufficiently related to the contact to make
specific jurisdiction fair. There will be hard cases.
I offer here a difficult case for consideration. In this "hard case"
hypothetical, the defendant advertises in the forum state, but the
plaintiff, a forum state resident, both bought the product and was
injured in another state. This advertising case hypothetical
assumes that the advertising is not itself a substantive element of
the claim. In other words, the plaintiff is not claiming that the
advertisement fraudulently induced him. If he were making such a
charge, then the case would be related. On the other hand, this
hypothetical assumes some but-for causation. If the advertising had
236. See text accompanying supra note 64 (discussing the second prong).
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no causal connection to the plaintiffs purchase, there would be no
relatedness. The plaintiff would have been injured even without the
defendant's forum state advertising contacts. The forum state
advertisement passes the initial screen of but-for causation but is
not a substantive element of the claim. Is this a significant enough
connection? Is it a meaningful link? The four fairness policies give
some guidance in this analysis.
The policy analysis is aided by focusing on the difference
between this advertising example and a vacation travel case such as
O'Connor.237 In this hypothetical, the defendant did not have any
plaintiff-specific knowledge or formalize a business relationship
with the plaintiff in the forum state. It merely advertised to an
unknown forum state audience that happened to include the
plaintiff. The difference-between general advertising and a
plaintiff-specific relationship-is likely enough to tip the scale
toward a finding of unfairness.
Analysis of three of the four fairness factors-reciprocity,
sovereignty, and convenience-in the advertising hypothetical is
similar to those in the vacation travel case. Reciprocity likely is
met. The defendant's advertisements in the forum state resulted in
a benefit-the plaintiffs purchase of the defendant's product.
Jurisdiction in the forum would be a burden proportionate to that
benefit. Sovereignty is weak, as it was in the vacation case, because
none of the activities at issue-the product defect and injury-
occurred in the forum state. But, just as with the vacation travel
case, the advertising is the start of the relationship that led to the
injury, albeit one step removed. Convenience again is weak in that
the conduct and injury evidence are largely located in another state.
The key difference in the advertising hypothetical is
predictability. In the vacation travel case, the defendant had a
knowing relationship with the plaintiff in the forum state and could
assume that all such relationships might lead to suit in the state. In
the advertisement example, because there is no known relationship
in the forum state, the defendant would have to assume jurisdiction
in the forum state on any claim brought by any person who ever was
influenced by advertising in the forum state.
This is a close case. I conclude that, on balance, the policy
concerns argue against a finding of relatedness based on mere
advertising. The primary weakness is predictability, a key concern
of the Court in specific jurisdiction cases. Purposeful availment
here would not protect predictability in that courts would find the
advertisement-the related contact-to be purposeful. The
237. See supra notes 216-22 (discussing O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co.,
496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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defendant knowingly and deliberately targeted its advertisements to
the forum state.
This hypothetical is difficult in part because, in most
applications, it presents a question of blended or intermediate
jurisdiction. It not only raises the foregoing question of relatedness,
but it also implicates the extent of contacts factor. A defendant
rarely posts a single advertisement. Because advertising is a close
case on relatedness, and because it usually involves multiple
contacts, this hypothetical raises the question of the fairness of
jurisdiction in cases where there are intermediate amounts of both
relatedness and extent of contacts. I address this form of blended or
hybrid jurisdiction below, in Part IV.E. Here, the question is
narrowly focused solely on relatedness. Does a single forum state
advertisement, by itself, have a sufficient connection to a product
claim that arises from manufacture, sale, use, and injury in another
state? I conclude no.2 3 8
There are seemingly infinite variations and applications of the
meaningful link test. Many standards, including constitutional
standards such as the purposeful availment element, turn on subtle
factual distinctions. Indeed, the Court in International Shoe warned
that "the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative."239
In sum, a causation standard best differentiates between
specific and general jurisdiction. The proper test would impose a
but-for test as an initial screen and also require some form of
meaningful link between the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. The four fairness concerns should
guide courts in determining whether that but-for cause is
sufficiently meaningful. This meaningful link test is consistent with
the Court's precedent. It avoids the problems of an unrestrained
but-for test and adequately serves the four fairness components.
Yet, it also avoids the sometimes too restrictive applications of the
proximate cause test and thereby gives plaintiffs a greater choice of
forums.
238. Cf. Lingo v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., No. 10-7032, 2011 WL 2621396, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2011) (distinguishing O'Connor, 496 F.3d 312, which arose
out of a contract, and finding that a Nevada hotel advertisement mailed to
Pennsylvania was not sufficiently related to plaintiffs injury in Nevada).
239. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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IV. GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER UNRELATED CLAIMS-EXTENT OF
CONTACTS AND OTHER QUESTIONS
Having decided that a claim is unrelated and thus mandates
general jurisdiction analysis, several other questions remain. The
basic question is the extent and nature of the forum state contacts
necessary to justify exercise of general jurisdiction. For years,
courts and commentators struggled to apply a test asking whether
the defendant's forum state contacts were "continuous and
systematic,"240 the phrase used in International Shoe to describe the
"maybe" case of general jurisdiction. The Court in Goodyear brought
some resolution by clarifying that the defendant's contacts not only
must be "continuous and systematic," but they also must be such
that the defendant is at home in the forum state.241 The Court gave
some guidance in applying the test when it rejected general
jurisdiction based on a low amount of sales in the forum state.
Nonetheless, uncertainty remains as to the proper application of the
at-home standard, including the timing of the contacts, general
jurisdiction over natural persons, and general jurisdiction over
corporations in states where they have varying degrees of business
contacts. I analyze these and other questions under the Court's
precedent and the four fairness concerns. I conclude that general
jurisdiction is very narrow-limited to the few places, most often
only a single place, where the defendant currently is at home.
A. 'At Home" The Proper Test for Extent of Contacts
Prior to Goodyear, the Court issued only two holdings
addressing the extent of contacts necessary to justify jurisdiction on
unrelated claims. In the 1952 case Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., the Court held that an Ohio state court properly could
assert general jurisdiction in a shareholder's claim against a
Philippine mining company that had halted operations during World
War II and moved its scaled-back office to Ohio.242 The Court stated
that the issue was one of fairness, referring to International Shoe's
multiple "[a]ppropriate tests" (the four case examples listed in
International Shoe).243 The Court explained that the case was in the
category where the defendant's contacts were "so substantial" that
they justified suit on causes of action entirely distinct from the
forum activities. 244 The defendant's president "carried on in Ohio a
240. See generally ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN
CIVIL ACTIONS, § 2-5[31[a] (3d ed. 1998); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS 348-52 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing "continuous and systematic" contacts).
241. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2853-54 (2011).
242. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
243. Id. at 445.
244. Id. at 446.
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continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited
wartime activities of the company."245 The company in essence had
relocated in Ohio for the duration of the war.
Thirty-two years later, the Court returned to the issue in
Helicol.246  There, the defendant operated a helicopter charter
service in South America, and one of its helicopters crashed in Peru,
killing American oil pipeline workers.247 Their widows sued in state
court in Texas. The defendant had purchased helicopters in Texas,
sent some of its staff for training in Texas, negotiated the particular
charter service with the decedents' employer in Texas, and taken
payment from checks drawn on Texas banks. 248 The Court held that
these contacts were not enough to support jurisdiction in Texas over
the case at hand, where the plaintiffs conceded that the claim was
unrelated to Helicol's Texas contacts. 249 Unlike the Ohio contacts in
Perkins, Helicol's contacts did not show a continuous and systematic
business presence in Texas.250
Perkins and Helicol by themselves did not give much clarity
with regard to general jurisdiction analysis. They affirmed the
legitimacy of general jurisdiction under the International Shoe
minimum contacts analysis, but they provided only marginal
guidance in determining the extent of contacts necessary to support
jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action. They used vague
references to "general business" contacts to describe the necessary
basis for general jurisdiction. In terms of their actual holding, the
two cases were relatively far apart with respect to the extent of
contacts at issue.251
In 2011, the Court in Goodyear did not completely resolve the
question, but it significantly advanced the analysis by setting an "at
home" standard for the continuous and systematic contacts
necessary for general jurisdiction. The Court declared that "[a]
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against
them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and
systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State."252
245. Id. at 448.
246. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408 (1985).
247. Id. at 409-10.
248. Id. at 410-12.
249. Id. at 417-19.
250. Id. at 416.
251. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 240, at 350 (stating that Perkins and
Helicol provided "some guidance at the margins" and that there are "literally
infinite numbers of factual permutations falling between the two cases").
252. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011).
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In Goodyear, the defendants were separately incorporated
foreign subsidiaries of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,253
based and operating in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. The three
foreign defendants' only contact with North Carolina was "a small
percentage" of their total tire sales.2 5 4 The Court held that these
sales were insufficient to support jurisdiction in North Carolina on
an unrelated claim. 2 5 5
Importantly, the Court clarified that the mere presence of
continuous and systematic contacts was not, by itself, sufficient for
general jurisdiction. It stated that "[a] corporation's 'continuous
activity of some sorts within a state,' International Shoe instructed,
'is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity."'256  This is an
important point because courts and commentators often applied this
International Shoe phrase-continuous and systematic-as the sole
test of general personal jurisdiction. 257
The Goodyear clarification is not a new standard but is instead
the correct reading of International Shoe. The Court in
International Shoe used this phrase to describe the "maybe" case of
jurisdiction (continuous and systematic contacts unrelated to the
suit), just as it used other terms to describe the "maybe" case for
specific jurisdiction (isolated or casual contacts that give rise to the
253. Goodyear USA, the parent company, also was a named defendant, but
it did not contest North Carolina's jurisdiction over it. Id. at 2852. The Court
declined to consider whether all Goodyear defendants should be treated as a
"single enterprise" because the plaintiffs "forfeited" this contention by not
raising it in the lower court. Id. at 2857.
254. Id. at 2852 ("tens of thousands out of tens of millions").
255. Id. at 2851 ("A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign
corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general
jurisdiction. Such a connection does not establish the 'continuous and
systematic' affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain
claims unrelated to the foreign corporation's contacts with the State."). A key
aspect of the Court's analysis was its rejection of the lower court's
misapplication of "stream of commerce" theory, a concept used in specific
jurisdiction cases to test purposeful availment, to justify its exercise of general
jurisdiction over the defendants:
The North Carolina court's stream-of-commerce analysis elided the
essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general)
jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer's products into the
forum . . . may bolster an affiliation germane to specific
jurisdiction. ... But ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific
jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties,
the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.
Id. at 2855 (citations omitted).
256. Id. at 2856 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318
(1945)).
257. See supra note 240.
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suit).258 These were merely "maybe" cases. Just as "related" is an
essential threshold for specific jurisdiction but not the sole question
(i.e., among other things, the contacts must be purposeful),
''continuous and systematic" is essential for general jurisdiction but
not necessarily sufficient.
The Court in Goodyear used Perkins as the "textbook" case to
clarify the "sorts" of continuous and systematic activities that would
satisfy due process. 259 "Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole
wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in
no sense at home in North Carolina."260 Elsewhere, the Court
described the "paradigm" case for general jurisdiction over
corporations as the place "in which the corporation is fairly regarded
as at home."2 61 The Court thus adopted an at-home test for the
''continuous and systematic" contacts necessary to establish general
jurisdiction.
The at-home standard narrows Perkins from its potentially wide
reach. Prior to Goodyear, Perkins was susceptible to a broad
reading. In terms of quantity, the Ohio activities were relatively
minor and few in number when compared either to the defendant
corporation's mining operations in the Philippines prior to World
War II or to the normal business activities of many domestic
corporations. 262 Although the Court in a dictum in Keeton described
the forum in Perkins as the defendant's "principal, if temporary,
place of business," 2 63 the Court in Helicol used a more open-ended
phrase, describing the defendant in Perkins as having "continuous
and systematic general business contacts" in Ohio.264 That phrase
could result in general jurisdiction in almost every state for many
258. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18.
259. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (citation omitted).
260. Id. at 2857.
261. Id. at 2853-54 (citing Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra note 3, at
728). Justice Ginsburg, the author of the opinion in Goodyear, again used the
at-home standard in her opinion in McIntyre when describing general personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[A]11 agree, McIntyre UK
surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction in New Jersey courts,
for that foreign-country corporation is hardly 'at home' in New Jersey.").
262. Compare Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48
(1952) (listing the defendant's activities in Ohio), with Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 95 N.E. 2d 5, 7-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (per curiam)
(indicating that the defendant's principal place of business was not in Ohio),
aff'd, 98 N.E. 2d 33 (Ohio 1951), cert. granted, 34 U.S. 808 (1951), vacated, 342
U.S. 437 (1952).
263. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 n.11 (1984) (citing
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448).
264. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 415-16 (1984) ("We thus must explore the nature of Helicol's contacts with
the State of Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.").
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major corporations. In Goodyear, the Court reined in that
description by using the at-home standard and by stating that the
defendant in Perkins "had ceased activities in the Phillippines" and
"[t]o the extent that the company was conducting any business
during and immediately after the Japanese occupation ... , it was
doing so in Ohio."265 The new Goodyear language has a tighter focus
than that of Helicol. A corporation might have "general business
contacts" in several states, but it is "at home" in very few states,
and, likely, in only a single place, as in Perkins.
The at-home standard is a good fit with the four fairness
principles. First, if a defendant has so many contacts with a state
that it is at home there, the great benefits of those contacts will be
reciprocal to the burden-unlimited jurisdiction.266 Second, suits
are predictable in the defendant's home state. Because the
defendant is at home in the state, it can expect to be sued there on
any act it did anywhere in the world. Third, although the state may
not have sovereignty over the activities that occurred in another
state, it has sovereignty over persons who make the state their
home.267 Finally, a defendant can conveniently defend an action
from its home, even if the claim arose elsewhere. The defendant will
be familiar with the legal system, culture, and infrastructure of his
home state.
The Court in Goodyear did not develop a multipart test for
general jurisdiction as it did for specific personal jurisdiction in
World- Wide Volkswagen.268 Once a claim is unrelated and subject to
general jurisdiction analysis, the sole question becomes whether the
defendant is "at home" in the forum state. There is no second
"reasonableness" prong. But that does not mean that courts cannot
look to broader fairness policy in making the at-home assessment.
Indeed, I contend that the four fairness concerns, derived from
International Shoe, appropriately should guide courts in applying
the at-home standard. I use those four fairness factors below to
define and apply the at-home standard in a variety of contexts.
265. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.
266. See Cebik, supra note 5, at 35-36 (arguing that residents "look to the
state for the enforcement of their rights and duties-if not through the courts
then through the general administration of the laws").
267. See Brilmeyer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 732.
268. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 294-
98 (1980); see supra note 45.
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B. Timing of the Contacts for General Jurisdiction 'At-Home"
Analysis
One element of general jurisdiction assessment is the timing of
the contacts. 269 Which contacts, in terms of their timing, are
relevant to general jurisdiction analysis? The Court has not directly
addressed this timing issue, but, previously, many lower courts
looked to a period of years immediately preceding and including the
filing date.270 A period of years may be appropriate in some cases,
but the primary focus should be current contacts at the time
plaintiff filed suit. This is especially true in light of the Goodyear at-
home standard.
To be sure, the Court in Perkins did not look at one particular
date in isolation but instead looked at the broader period in which
the defendant had been operating in Ohio.27 1 The point of this
inquiry, however, was whether the defendant had a general
business presence or, in the terms of Goodyear, whether it was then
at home in Ohio. A period of a few years might help assess whether
the defendant is now at home in a particular state, but former
contacts, which are now terminated, should be largely irrelevant.272
The timing element necessarily differs for general and specific
jurisdiction.273 Specific jurisdiction is claim specific, so it properly
looks at all of the events that relate to the claim, even though those
contacts may be long terminated. General jurisdiction, by contrast,
is defendant specific. It is not based on the activity at issue in the
suit but instead is based on the defendant's general activities in the
state. It is the current activity that makes unrelated jurisdiction
fair.
269. See generally Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts
After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (2011) (discussing
relevant timing of jurisdictional contacts).
270. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 569-70
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court erred in limiting its jurisdictional
inquiry to the year that the suit was filed and explaining that a reasonable
period for examining the defendant's contacts might entail several years); Pac.
Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. AXA Belgium, S.A., 785 F. Supp. 2d 457, 461, 468-69 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) (applying general jurisdiction analysis of contacts over a nine-year
period).
271. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 95 N.E. 2d 5, 6 (Ohio Ct. App.
1950) (noting that the defendant's bank accounts in Ohio had been active for
five years), aff'd, 98 N.E. 2d 33 (Ohio 1951), cert. granted, 34 U.S. 808 (1951),
vacated, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
272. See Potts v. Dyncorp Int'l, LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258-59 (M.D.
Ala. 2006) (stating that the individual defendant's prior residency and contacts
with Alabama were "no longer ... relevant").
273. See Simard, Hybrid Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 581-82 (discussing
the timing difference); see also Peterson, supra note 269, at 204 (discussing the
difference in timing between specific and general jurisdiction).
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General jurisdiction based solely, or even primarily, on former,
terminated contacts with the forum state would not satisfy the four
fairness concerns. It would not advance reciprocity. Although the
defendant once had a great deal of forum benefits, he no longer has
any. It would not be proportional to hold a defendant amenable to
suit for all time solely because he once had extensive contacts with
the state. It would not be predictable. The defendant would have to
assume that he would be subject to suit in any state in which he
once had extensive contacts, no matter how long ago. The state of
his former home would no longer have sovereignty over him. That a
state once had sovereignty over its resident does not mean that the
state retains that sovereignty for all time. Finally, although the
defendant might find defense of a suit in his former home state more
convenient that some other states-he would be familiar with the
legal system and culture of his former home-such convenience
would not be significantly greater than that in any other state with
which the defendant is generally familiar. He still would have the
burden of traveling to and defending in a state that has no
relationship to the claim.
Before Goodyear, lower courts often addressed this timing
question in the context of deciding the breadth of jurisdictional
discovery, and they typically allowed discovery over a period of
multiple years.274  Goodyear made such broad discovery less
essential. Formerly, the focus on the jurisdictional discovery in
lower courts often was the defendant's sales and other business
activities in the forum state to determine whether they were
"continuous and systematic." The examination now should focus on
where the defendant is at home. That inquiry need not focus
exclusively on a single day, but it likely does not need to cover a
period of multiple years. In sum, the proper test for the extent of
contacts is whether the defendant is now at home in the forum state.
C. General Jurisdiction Over Natural Persons
Because the Court's discussions of general jurisdiction based on
contacts all involved corporate defendants, the question arises
whether the doctrine applies at all to natural persons. 275 Justice
274. See Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 569 (allowing discovery for six years prior to
filing suit); Birnberg v. Milk St. Residential Assoc., No. 02 C 978, 2002 WL
1162848, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2002) (rejecting the plaintiffs request for
jurisdictional discovery over nineteen years but permitting discovery for a five-
year period).
275. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1268
(2010) (noting the "pressing" question of "whether contacts-based general
jurisdiction applies at all to individuals").
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Scalia raised this question in Burnham v. Superior Court.276 After
noting that the only holding (at that time) that had applied general
contacts-based jurisdiction was Perkins, involving a corporate
defendant, Justice Scalia said, "It may be that whatever special rule
exists permitting 'continuous and systematic' contacts . . . to support
jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the
forum applies only to corporations, which have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily on 'de facto
power over the defendant's person."'277 He is only partially correct
with regard to the history. It is true that, under Pennoyer, general
personal jurisdiction over natural persons usually arose solely from
in-state service, and the expansion of general jurisdiction based on
forum activities typically applied to corporations. 278 However, the
Court in Milliken v. Meyer 279 also expanded general jurisdiction to
apply to absent individuals who were domiciled in, but served
outside, the forum state.280
Moreover, nothing about International Shoe or the minimum
contacts test requires this limitation. International Shoe itself
involved a corporate defendant, but the Court subsequently applied
specific minimum contacts analysis to individual defendants. 281
General jurisdiction based on contacts is an integral part of
minimum contacts analysis, 2 8 2 and it seemingly should apply to
individuals, just as the specific jurisdiction component does. The
Court in Goodyear assumed general jurisdiction over individuals,
276. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
277. Id. at 610 n.1 (citations omitted).
278. Some assertions of jurisdiction over corporations, however, were specific
based on their forum state activities. See supra Part L.A (discussing uncertain
jurisdictional repercussions of corporate in-state activity in the Pennoyer era).
279. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
280. Id. at 462.
281. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-73 (1985)
(applying minimum contacts analysis to an out-of-state, natural person
defendant); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96-97 (1978) (assessing the
nature of an individual defendant's activities in California in a family law
dispute).
282. Some scholars characterize the general jurisdiction analysis as distinct
from "minimum contacts" analysis. See, e.g., THOMAs D. ROWE, JR., Beyond
Minimum Contacts: Other Bases for Jurisdiction, in CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed.
2012) (Chapter Nine, Section D) (placing the topics of general jurisdiction and
the minimum contacts analysis into separate chapters). Compare World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (establishing what
some observers call the first prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen test-i.e., the
"minimum contacts" prong), with Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316-17 (1945) (articulating general jurisdiction as part of its minimum contacts
test), and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,




albeit in a dictum,283 and Justice Kennedy's opinion in McIntyre (in
which Justice Scalia joined) did the same.284
Having said this, general jurisdiction based on an individual's
extensive contacts with a state may be a largely academic point.
This is because the Court permitted general jurisdiction over
natural persons based on in-state service in Burnham. 285 In any
situation in which an individual defendant has significant enough
contacts with a particular state to be at home there and warrant
general jurisdiction, the plaintiff usually can avoid and render moot
any minimum contacts analysis by serving the defendant in that
state.
The question nevertheless remains as to the nature of an
individual's contacts that would support general jurisdiction. The
Court largely answered this question in Goodyear by defining the
place as where the defendant is at home. However, dictum in
Goodyear also described an individual's domicile as the "paradigm
forum" for proper general jurisdiction. 286 In most cases, domicile
would describe the home of a natural person. "Domicile," in most
applications, best captures the essence of a person being at home, as
opposed to a case, for example, where a person merely visited the
state on a frequent basis. 287 But, in a few cases, even "domicile" is
not the proper at-home state for a natural person.
That domicile is an adequate basis on which to base general
jurisdiction is a very common proposition. It was one of Professor
Brilmayer's paradigm cases of unique affiliations. 288 The doctrine
has historical pedigree. In Milliken v. Meyer, the Court held that
the state of a defendant's domicile properly could assert personal
jurisdiction even if the defendant were absent and could not be
served in the state.289 Although the case predated International
Shoe, the Court in International Shoe cited Milliken for the
283. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
284. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).
285. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990).
286. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853; see also McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787
(listing citizenship and domicile as examples of general jurisdiction over natural
persons).
287. See Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2012 WL
2358306, at *7 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012) (rejecting discovery as to an individual
defendant's visits to Alabama-potentially as many as sixty-one visits in seven
years-because, even if true, those visits would not subject the defendant to
general jurisdiction in Alabama under the Goodyear standard); Red Strokes
Entm't, Inc. v. Sanderson, No. 3:12-CV-0008, 2012 WL 1514892, at *6-7 (M.D.
Tenn. May 1, 2012) (rejecting general jurisdiction in Tennessee over a
California resident who regularly transacted entertainment business in
Nashville).
288. Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 729.
289. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
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minimum contacts test itself, quoting Milliken's "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" language.
290
The historical pedigree might cause Justice Scalia and others to
conclude that domicile, like in-state service in Burnham, is an
automatic basis for general jurisdiction, consistent with due process,
independent of minimum contacts analysis.291 A majority of the
Court, however, has not adopted the historical pedigree
argument. 292 Moreover, even Justice Scalia's reasoning arguably
does not extend to a technical domiciliary. In Burnham, Justice
Scalia avoided Shaffer's holding that all assertions of jurisdiction
must be assessed under minimum contacts analysis by arguing that
the Shaffer mandate applied only to absent defendants, not persons
in the state at the time of service. 293 General jurisdiction based on
domicile, rather than in-state service, almost certainly would
connote an absent defendant. Thus, even under Justice Scalia's
logic in Burnham, International Shoe minimum contacts analysis
should apply to determine if general jurisdiction based on domicile
satisfies due process.
Domicile is a legal term used to fix one's location for a wide
variety of purposes, including federal diversity subject matter
jurisdiction and many aspects of choice of law. First-year law
students learn that the legal tests for domicile-usually phrased as
physical residence coupled with an intention to remain in that place
indefinitely294-can have odd results, fixing domicile in some cases
where a person has not had any contact for years. A good example
is the diversity case of Mas v. Perry,295 commonly included in Civil
Procedure casebooks. 296 There, a woman kept the domicile of her
childhood home of Mississippi, even though she had been married
and living elsewhere for years and had no intention of returning to
Mississippi. 29 7 She kept her domicile because she had yet to reside
in a new state in which she intended to remain indefinitely. The
court held that "[u]ntil she acquire[d] a new domicile, she
290. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
291. Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham relied extensively on the fact that
in-state personal service was an established form of personal jurisdiction at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990).
292. In Burnham, only three justices joined Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at
607.
293. Id. at 620-21; see supra notes 175-79 (discussing Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
294. See SCOLES ETAL., supra note 240, at 251.
295. 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974).
296. See, e.g., JOSEPH GLANNON ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 51
(2011); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 851
(5th ed. 2009).
297. Mas, 489 F.2d at 1400
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remain[ed] a domiciliary, and thus a citizen, of Mississippi."2 9 8
Mississippi would have remained her domicile even if she had not
had any contact with Mississippi for several years.
Not all courts would reach the same result on the domicile
issue,299 but the holding in Mas demonstrates that domicile is not
always a fair basis for general jurisdiction. The problem is that
domicile, in some applications, prioritizes intent, or more aptly lack
of intent, over contacts. Justice Kennedy spoke of intention to
submit to a state's authority in McIntyre,300 but he did not base
jurisdiction on the failure to form an intention to stay elsewhere. In
the Mas example, Mrs. Mas had no intention to submit to
Mississippi's authority. To the contrary, she had an intention not to
return to Mississippi. She simply had not decided where else she
wanted to live indefinitely.
Under the four fairness concerns, it would not be fair to make
Mrs. Mas return to Mississippi to defend a claim unrelated to the
state. Mrs. Mas had not received benefits from Mississippi in years,
so the burden of continuing broad jurisdiction there would not be
reciprocal. She could not predict that she would have to return to
Mississippi to defend a claim concerning her activities in another
state. Mississippi had no sovereignty over a citizen who left the
state years before and had never returned. Mississippi, as her
childhood residence, would not provide convenience in her
adulthood, years after leaving the state.
This is not to say that the place that qualifies as a domicile for
most persons will not be proper for general jurisdiction. In most
cases, jurisdiction will be proper in the state where the person is
domiciled. But, because it is a technical legal term, loaded with an
intent element, "domicile" is not an appropriate shorthand for the
place at which general jurisdiction is proper for a natural person.
The Goodyear Court coined a better term: "at home."
D. General Jurisdiction Over Corporations
There is no question that general jurisdiction properly applies
to corporations, and the test now seems to be clarified-where the
defendant corporation is at home. Goodyear gives some guidance on
the proper application of the at-home standard, but it obviously did
not settle every application. The Court in dictum cited two places
where general jurisdiction properly would apply to corporations-
298. Id.
299. Professor Glannon's casebook juxtaposes the Mas case with a similar
case in which the court found that the student had changed her domicile. See
GLANNON, supra note 296, at 42 (reprinting Gordon v. Steele, 376 F. Supp. 575
(W.D. Pa. 1974)).




the place of incorporation and the principal place of business. 301 In
addition, in its actual holding, the Court rejected the very low
percentage of sales present there as a proper basis for general
jurisdiction. 302 This leaves many questions, including the propriety
of jurisdiction where the corporate defendant has an intermediate
level of business contacts falling short of principal place of business.
I contend that a reasonable summary of the proper places for
general jurisdiction can be taken from Goodyear-incorporation and
principal place of business are proper bases for general jurisdiction,
but sales are not. Indeed, all other business contacts, including
mere registration to do business, fall short of the standard for
general jurisdiction.3 03
1. Incorporation and Principal Place of Business
The Court in Goodyear identified the paradigm at-home states
of a corporation as the states of its incorporation and principal place
of business. 304 Like domicile, these descriptions of jurisdiction are
both common and rooted in history. They describe citizenship for
purposes of federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction, but unlike
domicile, these terms also properly describe places in which a
corporate defendant has sufficient contacts to justify general
jurisdiction. General jurisdiction fairly may be asserted against a
corporation in the state in which it is incorporated and the state in
which in maintains its principal place of business. This conclusion,
however, stems from the nature of the contacts associated with
incorporation and principal place of business, not any technical legal
conclusion.
The state of incorporation is the easiest case. At one time, it
was the only state in which a corporation could be sued. 305 More
importantly, the state of incorporation would pass modern minimum
301. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2854 (2011).
302. Id. at 2857.
303. Sarah Cebik argued for these as the only bases for general jurisdiction:
In general, three circumstances exist in which a forum would be able
to assert jurisdiction over a defendant corporation under the
minimum contacts test which looks to the limits of state interests in
the defendant. First, the defendant's state of incorporation will have
an interest in the defendant. Second, the state in which the
defendant shapes is corporate policy will have the required minimum
contacts. Finally, the state in which the defendant conducts the core
activities of the corporation will have an interest in exercising
jurisdiction. A state does not have an interest in a defendant merely
because it registers to do business in the state or is 'doing business'
there.
Cebik, supra note 5, at 36.
304. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
305. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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contacts analysis for general jurisdiction. The corporation is at
home in its state of incorporation even if it has no offices and does
no business there. That state is in essence the birth state of the
corporation, and it is a birthplace that the corporation never left.
The corporation continues as an entity solely because of the laws of
the state of its incorporation.
General jurisdiction in the state of incorporation is consistent
with the four fairness rationales. 306 The corporation arguably gets
more benefits from this state than any other. It owes its very
existence to this state.307  Extensive burdens in the form of
unlimited jurisdiction would not be disproportionate. The
corporation easily could predict this state as the state of general
jurisdiction. 308 The state has sovereignty over entities it creates.
Finally, the state is a convenient place in which to defend suits, even
unrelated suits. The corporation's personnel may have some travel
burden, but they are intimately familiar with the laws and court
system of the state.
The state of a corporation's principal place of business-at least
as currently defined by the Court for purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction-also passes the Goodyear at-home test. "Principal
place of business" is a term of art by which Congress defined a
corporation's state of citizenship for purpose of federal diversity
subject matter jurisdiction. 309 Courts for years struggled to define
this statutory term. In 2010, the Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend310
settled on a "nerve center" test defining principal place of business
as "the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation's activities."311
The Hertz test has no direct application to general jurisdiction,
which is a question of due process, not a question of federal
statutory subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, in every case, the state of
a corporation's nerve center under Hertz also should qualify as the
306. See Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 733 (outlining the
policy reasons why the state of incorporation is the paradigm basis for general
jurisdiction and stating that "the decision to incorporate in a particular state
provides a more powerful basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction than does
domicile").
307. See Cebik, supra note 5, at 36-37 ("The state [of incorporation] provides
a registered corporation the full array of rights and duties necessary to the
corporate existence: the state provides a set of rules which structure corporate
governance, the state allows the corporation to issue stock, and the state
established the limited liability of investors which is the hallmark of
corporations.").
308. Professor Brilmayer argues that the incorporation process and papers
themselves give this notice. Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at
733-34.
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
310. 130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010).
311. Id. at 1192.
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corporation's home for purposes of general jurisdiction.312 Unlike
"domicile," a term laden with an artificial intent element, the Hertz
test for principal place of business turns on the corporation's actual
activities. The activities that Hertz finds decisive-direction, control
and coordination of the corporation's overall activities-
appropriately capture the place at which a corporation is at home.
This would be true even in the "anomaly" cases cited by the
Court in Hertz.313 The Court recognized that application of the
nerve center test in some applications would put the principal place
of business in a state that did not predominate in terms of the
corporation's workforce or business operations. As an example, the
Court described a corporation with the bulk of its business activities
visible to the public taking place in New Jersey but with officers in
New York City.314 The Court concluded that the nerve center, and
thus the principal place of business for diversity purposes, would be
New York.315
The Hertz nerve center standard, even in this anomaly case,
satisfies the four fairness concerns as applied to general jurisdiction.
The corporation receives significant benefits from the place in which
its core operations are directed, controlled, and coordinated. Even if
the corporation has most of its other operations in another state, the
corporation could not function absent this direction. The officers of
the corporation could predict that the entity would be subject to suit
in this state. It is where they personally are centered. This state
has sovereignty over the corporation because it is the state from
which all actions of the corporation flow. Finally, convenience is
met. The corporate officers have chosen this state as their base.
They are familiar with the state's laws and legal system, and, to the
extent they must personally participate in the defense, this state is
the most convenient for them. It is their home as well as that of the
corporation.
This anomaly case, however, suggests a very limited exception
where a corporation might have more than one home based on
business contacts (as opposed to incorporation). In cases where the
vast bulk of operations are in a single state other than the nerve
center, the corporation might be at home in two states-the nerve
center state and the operations state. Few corporations would
qualify for this additional state in which they are at home. In the
312. Compare Feder, supra note 8, at 692 n.108 (arguing that the Hertz
principal place of business standard satisfies the Goodyear at-home standard),
with Stein, supra note 8, at 546 (urging caution in finding multiple at-home
states but rejecting the Hertz test as the single standard for general personal
jurisdiction).
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anomaly case, the operations state is an additional state because the
corporation always would be at home in its true nerve center,
regardless of where its operations occur. This extension of an
additional home state would not apply to corporations that have
operations spread out across the nation. In these cases, the only at-
home state for general jurisdiction would be the nerve center state.
This narrow extension of the at-home finding is limited and
would not include states that might satisfy alternative tests for
principal place of business. In particular, I would reject the test
used by the lower court in Hertz, which found Hertz's principal place
of business to be California because California, due to its relative
population and size, constituted the vast majority of its business. 316
I explain this reasoning more in the next two Subparts, but I state
the proposition here to clarify my conclusion that the corporation is
at home, for purposes of general jurisdiction, in its principal place of
business. That place is usually only a single state, but in rare cases,
it may include two states.
2. Sales in the Forum State
Courts and commentators long have struggled with whether
sales alone are sufficient to support general jurisdiction, and, if so,
what amount or proportion of sales is necessary for general
jurisdiction. 317  In a previous article, I devoted substantial
discussion to these questions. 18 Goodyear brought some closure to
this issue when the Court rejected general jurisdiction based on the
sales. 319  However, because the North Carolina sales there
constituted only a "small percentage" of the defendants' total sales,
some questions remain as to larger volumes of sales.320 I contend
316. Id. at 1186-87.
317. Compare Wood, supra note 5, at 614-15 (arguing that general
jurisdiction "should not be found in every state where a defendant has a
significant amount of business," but instead should be "confined to those few
places that can legitimately be viewed as ... [a] corporation's base of
operations"), with Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 741-43
(arguing that place of incorporation and principal place of business are not the
only legitimate places for general jurisdiction and that "the nonunique
relationship of continuous and systematic activities . . . satisfies the reciprocal
benefits and burdens rationale as well as do unique affiliations").
318. See Andrews, supra note 5.
319. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2856-57 (2011); see Charles W. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 429
n.258 (2012) (noting that Goodyear caused him to "rethink" his position that a
corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction by "by producing goods or
services in the state").
320. See Peterson, supra note 269, at 214-18 (arguing that an "appropriate
interpretation of Goodyear" would find general jurisdiction based on "some
substantial volume of sales made directly into the forum state").
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that forum state sales, no matter how substantial, are never, by
themselves, sufficient to make the defendant "at home" for purposes
of general jurisdiction.
Prior to Goodyear, the Court had provided only dictum
regarding forum sales and general jurisdiction. The Court stated in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Co. that the defendant's sales of 10,000-
15,000 magazines every month in New Hampshire were not enough
to support general jurisdiction there. 321 Although the New
Hampshire sales were a very low percentage of Hustler's national
sales, 3 2 2 the sales arguably could have met a vague "continuous and
systematic" standard because they were regular, monthly sales.
Yet, they did not put Hustler at home in New Hampshire.
Lower courts were divided as to whether sales volume alone
could support personal jurisdiction. 32 3 Many refused to base general
jurisdiction on even relatively large amounts of sales. In Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corporation,324 for example, the Fifth Circuit
reversed a finding of general jurisdiction where the defendant sold
$250 million in airplane products in the forum. 325 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit in Shute rejected general jurisdiction based on forum
cruise sales of only 1.29% of the defendant's total cruise sales.32 6
Yet, other courts before Goodyear based general jurisdiction on a low
relative amount of sales in the forum state.327
321. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
322. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd
and remanded, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
323. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 240, at 351 (stating that courts "are severely
divided as to whether substantial in-state sales" support general jurisdiction);
see also 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 108.41[3]
(3rd ed. 2012) (stating that "lower courts have evinced a reluctance to assert
general jurisdiction over . . . foreign corporations even where the contacts with
the forum are quite extensive").
324. 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
325. Id. at 372-73. The court relied in part on the fact that the defendant
structured the sales to occur in its home state of Kansas in an attempt to shield
itself from the general jurisdiction of other states. Id. at 375-76 (stating that
the defendant "has not afforded itself the benefits and protections of the laws of
Texas, but instead has calculatedly avoided them").
326. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1988),
reversed on other ground, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see supra notes 138-46
(discussing Shute, 897 F.2d 377).
327. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CeCo Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566,
570 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding general jurisdiction where the defendant had less
than one percent of its total sales in the forum); Ex Parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481
So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (basing general jurisdiction on sales ranging only
from $65,000 to $85,000 over a five-year period, even though the defendant
structured its sales to occur either through independent agents or through mail
from its home state of Missouri); see also Ex Parte United Bhd. of Carpenters,
688 So. 2d 246, 251-52 (Ala. 1997) (reaffirming Newco and permitting general
jurisdiction over the defendant union based on ten local affiliates with Alabama
membership constituting only one half of one percent of total membership).
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Scholars debated these issues. Professor Brilmayer argued that
general jurisdiction properly could be based on "substantial local
[forum state] activities," but she did not specify the nature of those
activities-sales, local offices, or manufacturing. 32 8 She argued that
the adequacy of the forum state activities should not be based on
their amount relative to the corporation's activities in other states
but instead should be based on their absolute quantity in the forum
state.329  Professor Twitchell argued for a more narrow
interpretation of the proper places for general jurisdiction and noted
that courts tended to look at comparative sales volumes "because
they lack any better guide."33 0
A policy analysis argues against ever basing general jurisdiction
on mere sales volume. First, this standard would not help achieve
reciprocity. The defendant has a defined set of benefits-whatever
the sales volume in the state-but almost unlimited burdens in
defending all possible claims, by all plaintiffs, on all matters
worldwide. Second, a sales standard would give little predictability.
The defendant would have to assume that it was subject to
jurisdiction on all possible claims, even unrelated employment or
antitrust suits, merely because it regularly sold a certain product in
the state. The state would have a weak sovereignty interest. The
actual activity underlying the claims necessarily occurred
elsewhere, and the defendant is far from being a forum citizen. The
state has sovereignty over that defendant's particular sales in the
state, but those sales alone do not give the state a legitimate
sovereignty interest in every activity that the defendant does
anywhere in the world.
Considerations of convenience are mixed. They do not argue
strongly against general jurisdiction based on sales alone, but they
also do not argue for it. On the one hand, the defendant found
access to the state to be sufficiently convenient to distribute its
products there. On the other hand, the fact that the defendant was
able to sell its product in the forum state does not mean that defense
of an unrelated suit is convenient. By definition, the claims do not
derive from the defendant's forum activities, so relevant evidence is
unlikely to be located in the state. Unlike the defendant's home
base, sales alone do not necessarily mean that the defendant has
ease and familiarity with the state's entire legal system and culture.
This analysis would be true for all levels of sales. Admittedly,
when the defendant has a significant amount of sales, it gets greater
forum benefits, but balance is not achieved because the burdens
would be unlimited. The seller would have to face suit on any claim
328. Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 741-42.
329. Id.
330. Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 4, at 187-89.
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arising anywhere in the world. As I explore more fully in the next
Subparts, reciprocity needs a significant, arguably unique,
relationship to offset these burdens. Mere sales, no matter how
significant, do not create this unique connection to a state.
Similarly, a high volume of sales would not make suits on other
nonsales matters predictable. Nor would such sales give the state
any greater sovereignty interest over these outside matters.
Convenience might begin to tilt with a greater volume of sales,
creating greater familiarity with the legal system and forum state
culture, but convenience alone does not outweigh the other fairness
considerations. In sum, although the fairness concerns are not as
compelling for a high volume of sales as they are with low volumes,
such as those in Keeton and Goodyear, the concerns, on balance, do
not support general jurisdiction based solely on any level of sales.
The state would have fairly extensive specific jurisdiction on claims
arising from the high volume of in-state sales.
3. "Doing Business" and Corporate Registration
I next address whether there is any significance of the
corporation "doing business," or registering to do business, in the
forum state.331 To some degree, this issue is redundant of the above
analyses of principal place of business and sales volume. However,
because these terms seem to have special significance to the Court
and others, I separately analyze whether either "doing business" or
registration is an adequate basis for general jurisdiction.
In many jurisdiction cases, the court's statement of the
pertinent contacts of the corporate defendant include whether the
defendant was "doing business" in the forum state or registered to
do business there. The implication is that these places might
support general jurisdiction. The Court in Rush v. Savchuck332
stated this explicitly, albeit in dicta, where it said that the
defendant insurer was "'found,' in the sense of doing business, in all
50 States" and that its "forum contacts would support in personarn
jurisdiction even for an unrelated cause of action." 33 3 In Goodyear,
the Court stated that "[ijn contrast to the parent company, Goodyear
USA, which does not contest . .. jurisdiction over it, petitioners are
331. See Feder, supra note 8, at 678-84 (analyzing "doing business" as a
basis for general jurisdiction after Goodyear); Rhodes, supra note 319, at 430
(discussing Goodyear and concluding that "[t]he long-standing fiction that
'doing business' creates corporate 'presence' and supports a corporation's
amenability to general jurisdiction has been vanquished"); Stein, supra note 8,
at 547-48 (rejecting registration as a basis for general jurisdiction).
332. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
333. Id. at 330.
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not registered to do business in North Carolina." 334 I contend that
neither "doing business" nor registration, by itself, confers general
jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is limited to the one or two states
in which the corporation is at home.
The "doing business" standard has a long history, but that
history does not answer whether "doing business" is itself enough for
general jurisdiction. In the Pennoyer era, courts often used this
standard to determine whether corporations who had not registered
were nonetheless subject to jurisdiction in the state through a
theory of implied consent or fictional presence. 335 Satisfaction of
that standard resulted in general jurisdiction in some cases but only
specific jurisdiction in others, depending on the court and theory of
jurisdiction. Indeed, this was one of the anomalies of the Pennoyer-
era standards that the Court in International Shoe attempted to
eliminate. The Court substituted the minimum contacts analysis
and used the "maybe" case of general jurisdiction as a shorthand to
describe all of these cases. It would be a distortion of the historical
role of the "doing business" standard to conclude that it
automatically confers general jurisdiction.
A preliminary consideration is defining what activities
constitute "doing business" in the state. 336  It is a very broad
standard, as it was in the Pennoyer era. 337 It may connote merely
that the defendant has sales in the forum state. It also may mean
that the defendant is engaged in marketing and advertising, which
likely would occur whenever a corporation has any regular sales in a
state. General jurisdiction should not follow from this form of "doing
business" for the same reasons that I outline in Part IV.D.2 for sales
volume. "Doing business" also might connote corporate offices and
facilities in the state. Such operations might rise to the level of a
"nerve center" principal place of business, and if so, the corporation
would be at home in that state, subject to general jurisdiction.
However, if the contacts fall short of the principal place of business
standard, the fact that they may be described as "doing business"
does not confer general jurisdiction.
Take as an example a corporation such as McDonald's. Before
Goodyear was decided, Professor Glannon argued that, because the
334. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2852 (2011). The Court continued with a litany of contacts that the defendants
did not have-"no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in the State,"
no manufacturing, no advertising, and no solicitation of business in North
Carolina. Id.
335. See supra Part I.A.
336. One of Professor Twitchell's principal objections to general jurisdiction
based on "doing business" is its uncertainty and malleability. See generally
Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 4.




corporation has a very strong physical presence in most states,
through its numerous employees and restaurants, McDonald's has
''continuous and systematic" contacts in these states and is subject
to general jurisdiction in all such states. 338 This is too broad a
standard. Under Goodyear, the question is not whether McDonald's
has "continuous and systematic" contacts in these states but instead
is whether it is at home in the states. I answer no. Merely doing
business in a state should not confer general personal jurisdiction
for many of the same reasons that a large quantum of sales should
not. The mere fact that the defendant has many physical properties
and employees, in addition to sales, in the state does not render that
state the home of the corporation.
I contend that the at-home standard is necessarily limited.
That phrase suggests a single place or very few places. 339 The Court
in Goodyear focused on the singular nature of the defendant's Ohio
contacts in Perkins.340 It described the defendant as doing business
in Ohio and in no other place.341 Some scholars before Goodyear
advocated for a single place, similar to home, for general personal
jurisdiction. 34 2 Professor Twitchell, for example argued for a single
place of general jurisdiction in order to provide a single predictable
forum in which the defendant always may be sued. 3 43
338. See GLANNON, supra note 296, at 259-60; see also Peterson, supra note
269, at 259-60 (noting that before Goodyear, "most scholars" assumed that a
company such as General Motors would be "subject to general jurisdiction in
every state").
339. As I set out in Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.2, a corporation can have more at-
home states than literally one-its state of incorporation, and if different, its
principal place of business. Also, in a very few cases, the corporation might
have two principal places of business. However, for ease of reference, I will
refer to a single place.
340. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2856
(2011).
341. Id.
342. See Stein, supra note 5, at 758 (arguing that the test for general
personal jurisdiction should be "whether the defendant has adopted the forum
as its sovereign" and that the court should not ask about convenience but
instead should ask whether the defendant has "for most other purposes treated
the forum as its home, notwithstanding its domicile elsewhere"); Wood, supra
note 5, at 614 ("The point of general jurisdiction theory is to permit suit in the
defendant's 'home'-the one or two places where a person or entity has
settled.").
343. See supra note 112 (quoting Professor Twitchell). Other scholars point
out that Professor Twitchell later modified her view to encompass "doing
business" jurisdiction. See Stein, supra note 8, at 532 n.45. Professor Twitchell
did announce a "change of heart," but she still argued that "the best solution
would be for the Supreme Court to recognize, and insist that ... due process
does not permit 'general' doing business jurisdiction unless the state has such
significant ties with the forum that the court would feel equally justified in
deciding a wholly-unrelated claim." Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 4, at
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Although I agree that general jurisdiction is necessarily limited
and narrow, I do not agree that the rationale underlying general
jurisdiction is the need for an available forum. General jurisdiction
is not a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity. 344 I acknowledge that
this rationale can be seen in Perkins,345 but Helicol confirms that
there need not be an available forum. 346 Texas was the closest state
for general jurisdiction, but the Court rejected it.847 There
apparently was no state in the nation in which the South American
defendant would be subject to general jurisdiction. Likewise, under
the facts stated in both Goodyear and McIntyre, there likely is no
state in which any of the foreign national defendants are subject to
general jurisdiction.348
I instead justify the narrow reach of general jurisdiction under
the four fairness concerns. I contend that a single home is the
proper standard, not because the aim is to provide a single forum
but rather because, in almost all circumstances, only a single place
satisfies the four fairness aims of general jurisdiction.
To achieve reciprocity, the benefits of the forum state must be
very high to offset the unlimited burdens of general jurisdiction.
Indeed, the burden of unlimited jurisdiction is quite high, prompting
the question whether any amount of business can offset that burden.
Professor Stein used this point-the unlimited burdens of general
jurisdiction-to argue that reciprocity is not a legitimate policy
concern underlying general jurisdiction.3 49  In a similar vein,
Professor Twitchell questioned whether reciprocity or quid pro quo
theory properly applied to general jurisdiction.350 She acknowledged
that reciprocity was important to specific jurisdiction because
relatedness keeps the risks proportionate to the benefits, but she
observed that there was no equivalent proportionality for activities
based on general jurisdiction. 5' She based this observation on the
fact that courts regularly exercise general jurisdiction over
defendants with no physical presence in the forum state.352
171, 213. That conclusion is consistent with a narrow, single place view of
general jurisdiction.
344. See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1350-72 (discussing the uncertain
validity of the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity).
345. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
346. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 419 n.13 (1984).
347. Id. at 418-19.
348. This would not be true for domestic U.S. corporations because they
have at least a local state of incorporation.
349. See Stein, supra note 8, at 537.





I argue that reciprocity does in fact have a proper role in
general jurisdiction analysis. The potential breadth of the burdens
imposed by general jurisdiction does not undermine reciprocity as a
fairness concern but instead argues for limiting the locations for
general jurisdiction to unique or special places. Reciprocity helps
demonstrate why lower courts were incorrect in asserting general
jurisdiction on "doing business" contacts. Reciprocity demonstrates
why the Supreme Court correctly limited general jurisdiction to the
home state. In order to achieve even a rough reciprocity, there must
be something special about the benefits. For example, in Perkins,
the defendant had a relatively low level of business activity, in
terms of sheer quantity, but Ohio was unique to the corporation.
During the war, it owed its existence to Ohio.
A standard based on a single at-home state, as opposed to one
embracing multiple states of doing business, also promotes
predictability. The corporation would know that it is subject to
general jurisdiction in one state and that, in all other states, it
would be subject to specific jurisdiction only on suits related to its
conduct in those other states. The at-home standard easily
identifies the state of general jurisdiction. The business knows its
jurisdictional exposure based on where it chose to base its
operations. Without such a limitation, the corporation would have
to guess as to which intermediate levels of business would expose it
to unlimited jurisdiction.
The sovereignty concern also argues for a narrow reach of
general jurisdiction. A state does not have sovereignty over all of a
corporation's activities solely because the corporation chose to
conduct some, or even a significant amount, of its business there. To
be sure, the state would have a great deal of sovereignty over a
corporation that conducts a significant amount of business within its
borders-because the amount of the activity is significant-but the
state's sovereignty would extend only to that particular business, in
the form of specific jurisdiction. To justify jurisdiction over a case
entirely unrelated to that state, the state must have sovereignty
over the person of the defendant. Professor Stein and others have
defined this to be a "citizen-like affiliation": "There is something
different about the authority that one's home state has toward
members of its political community."353 I agree with the concept, if
not the literal term "citizen." The special sovereignty concern is
precisely what "home" conveys.
Finally, for the corporation to enjoy full convenience in defense
of unrelated claims, the suit must be brought in the corporation's
unique home state. By definition, the corporation already must
transport the case-specific evidence to the home state, but it should
353. See Stein, supra note 8, at 538, 542.
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not also have to transport its home conveniences to another state.
In sum, the corporation should not be subject to general jurisdiction
based merely on it "doing business" in the forum.
The term "doing business" may be jurisdictionally significant in
another way because it often connotes that the corporation is
registered to do business in the state. Many state registration
statutes use the term "doing business" as the triggering event
requiring registration. 354 These statutes have a long history. In the
Pennoyer era, states and courts used registration statutes as a
means to get a corporation to formally consent to jurisdiction. 3 5 5
Because the typical triggering condition was "doing business," courts
borrowed that term to imply consent or find fictional presence when
the corporation had not formally registered and consented to
jurisdiction.
Perhaps due to this historical connection between "doing
business," registration, and jurisdiction, many modern observers
conclude (or assume) that registration to do business automatically
confers jurisdiction. This is perhaps why so many corporate
defendants, such as the Goodyear parent company, do not challenge
jurisdiction. This likely is a mistaken assumption, even as to
Goodyear USA.356
First, most corporate registration statutes do not state the
jurisdictional repercussions of registration. 35 7 In a tradition dating
back to the Pennoyer era, most registration statutes require merely
that the corporation name an in-state agent for service of process
354. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b) (2011); M.D. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'Ns § 7-202 (LexisNexis 2007).
355. See supra Part L.A (discussing registration under the Pennoyer
doctrine).
356. I previously argued that this mistaken assumption is why so many
corporate defendants fail to challenge personal jurisdiction in the states in
which they are registered. See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1331-32, 1360-67.
But see Borchers, supra note 275, at 1267 (arguing that, if Goodyear is read
narrowly, it would make the parent corporation's decision not to challenge
jurisdiction "foolish" and that it is "unlikely" that the Court would have failed to
affirm jurisdiction over Goodyear USA).
357. See Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of
Permitting Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1,
2 (1990) (collecting statutes and stating that "each state mandates that an
agent be appointed" but that "most statutes fail to discuss the effects of
appointment on the state's jurisdiction over the foreign corporation"); see also In
re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 n.10 (D. Md.
1981), modified, 541 F.Supp. 62 (D. Md. 2000) ("[C]onsent statutes are largely
obsolete and serve only to confuse matters . .. ."); William L. Walker, Foreign
Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47 N.C. L. REV. 733, 734-38 (1969)
(arguing that the requirement that corporations appoint local agents has no
jurisdictional purpose after International Shoe and that registration statutes
"have encouraged inappropriate expansions of unlimited general jurisdiction
and discouraged worthwhile analysis").
[Vol. 471070
2012] GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION 1071
and do not mention "jurisdiction."358 A few states interpret this
appointment of an agent only as a means of facilitating service
(notice) where jurisdiction is otherwise proper under minimum
contacts analysis.359 Some hold that the local registration statute
confers jurisdiction but only specific jurisdiction over claims arising
out of the corporation's in-state activities.360 In these states, mere
registration would not confer general jurisdiction over a registering
corporation.
Some states, however, interpret their registration statutes as
conferring general jurisdiction.ae1 They do so on one of two theories.
First, a very few cite to Burnham and use a theory of tag jurisdiction
over corporations based on the corporation's appointment of an in-
358. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.03 (1998) (providing that an
application for a certificate of authority to transact business in the state must
set forth the name and address of the corporation's registered agent in the
state); see also id. § 15.10 ("The registered agent of a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in this state is the corporation's agent for
service of process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served
on the foreign corporation."). Very few states have modified their statutes to
specify that they have no impact on a foreign corporation's amenability to suit.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(4) (2007) (providing that the requirement of a
certificate of authority "has no application to the question of whether any
foreign corporation is subject to service of process and suit in this state").
359. See Freeman v. District Court, 1 P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) ("[Tlhe
appointment of an agent to receive service of legal process pursuant to [the
Nevada foreign insurance corporation registration statute] does not in itself
subject the non-resident insurance company to the personal jurisdiction of
Nevada courts."); see also Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Texas registration statute may extend
only jurisdiction that is otherwise "constitutionally permissible" under
independent minimum contacts analysis).
360. See Freeman Funeral Home Inc. v. Diamond S. Constructors, Inc., 266
So. 2d 794, 795-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972) (holding that "a statutory agent may be
served with process only in cases where the cause of action arose in [Alabama]"
because the Alabama foreign registration statute was "enacted to protect the
citizens of the state as to causes of action arising within the state and resulting
from the doing of business by foreign corporations in this state," and thus a
corporation's consent to jurisdiction "is confined to transactions or causes of
action arising in this state and not those arising in other states"); Gray Line
Tours v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that a California statute requiring consent for service on an in-
state agent did not confer jurisdiction on suits not arising out of business done
in California). See generally JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, supra note 323, 1
108.41[4] (stating that some statutes are limited to specific jurisdiction and
others are interpreted to confer only specific personal jurisdiction).
361. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 240, § 3-2[2][a] (surveying
interpretations of statutes); Kipp, supra note 357, at 44 ("[OJnly a few states
have registration statutes that expressly provide for the assertion of general
jurisdiction.").
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state agent for service. 362 This almost certainly is not a proper
view.363 Burnham involved in-state service on a natural person, and
Justice Scalia suggested that tag jurisdiction is limited to natural
persons.364 Even under Pennoyer, where service was the primary
means of securing jurisdiction, corporate jurisdiction was based on
theories of implied consent or presence through business activities,
not the mere fact of in-state service. 365 The Court in the Pennoyer
era repeatedly held that in-state service on a corporate agent was
not enough to confer jurisdiction where the corporation otherwise
did not do sufficient business in the state.366 In International Shoe
itself, the defendant's salesman was served in the forum, but the
Court based jurisdiction on contacts, rather than in-state service.367
Similarly, in Perkins, the defendant's president was served in Ohio
while acting in his corporate capacity, but the Court based general
jurisdiction on the corporation's forum contacts, not in-state
service.368
Most courts that rely on corporate registration to confer general
jurisdiction do so on a second theory of consent, rather than a
minimum contacts analysis.369  A consent theory changes the
constitutional inquiry. First, it shifts any due process analysis from
362. Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Indus., 576 A.2d 942, 944 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (applying Burnham and holding that service on the corporate
defendant's registered agent conferred general jurisdiction on unrelated claims).
363. See Wenche Siemer, 966 F.2d at 182 (rejecting the argument that
Burnham establishes that service on an in-state agent "automatically subjects
the corporation to jurisdiction"); MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop
Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627, 631 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (distinguishing
Burnham and holding that in-state service on a corporate officer "cannot alone
confer general jurisdiction"). But see Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal
Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L.
REV. 549, 600-01 (2012) (noting the possibility that Goodyear left open the
question of personal jurisdiction through service on an official in-state agent).
364. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 & n.1 (1990); see
supra note 293 (discussing this dictum in Burnham).
365. See supra Part L.A (discussing corporate jurisdiction under Pennoyer).
366. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195
(1915) (holding that service on a corporate director who is a forum resident is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction); Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156
U.S. 518, 522 (1895) (holding that service on the defendant's president who was
temporarily in forum was insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
367. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 312, 320 (1945) (discussing
service).
368. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438-40, 445
(1952). The Court stated that statutes requiring corporations to obtain a
license and designate a statutory agent for service are not "conclusive" as to
jurisdiction. Id. at 445.
369. Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting a Minnesota registration statute as conferring general jurisdiction
and stating that "[o]ne of the most solidly established ways of giving such
consent is to designate an agent for service of process within the State").
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minimum contacts to the validity of the consent. Under Bauxites,
consent is a proper basis for jurisdiction, independent of
International Shoe minimum contacts analysis. 370 This raises the
question whether registration is a valid form of consent. This topic
is beyond the scope of this Article, in which I focus on general
jurisdiction based on the defendant's contacts, but a few scholars
have argued that forced consent to general jurisdiction through a
corporate registration statute may violate due process.3 71
Even if consent through registration were to survive due process
scrutiny, it would face problems under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. I hope to more fully develop this question in a later article,
but I briefly discuss it here to give some context to the question. In
the period immediately preceding International Shoe, the Court
used the Dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate some exercises of
general jurisdiction.372 Since then, the doctrine rarely has been
invoked in the context of personal jurisdiction, but some
commentators have raised Dormant Commerce Clause concerns
with registration statutes.3 78
370. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703 (1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be
waived.").
371. See Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 3, at 755-60 (questioning
consent to jurisdiction and stating that the "most formidable constitutional
issue surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when consent derives
from a statutorily required appointment rather than from contract") (footnote
omitted); see also CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 240, § 3.2[2] [a] [ii] (stating that
consent through registration statutes "may raise due process problems if the
required consent is held to extend to causes of action unrelated to the state and
to claims by persons having no connection with the state"); D. Craig Lewis,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment
of an Agent: An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7
(1990) (arguing that the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" bars states
from using corporate registration statutes to exact consent not otherwise
sufficient under minimum contacts analysis); Rhodes, supra note 319, at 443-44
(arguing that general jurisdiction based on corporate registration is "unfair"
and that the issue is "ripe for invalidation by the Supreme Court").
372. Davis v. Farmer's Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316-18 (1923)
(holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause forbade Minnesota from asserting
jurisdiction and noting that the case resembled two cases in which the Court
had previously upheld jurisdiction but stating that "in both cases the only
constitutional objection asserted was violation of the due process clause"); see
supra notes 33-34 (discussing Davis and related cases).
373. Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction,
and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1189 (2003) (noting
that registration-consent statutes might be "obnoxious to the Commerce
Clause"); T. Griffin Vincent, Comment, Toward a Better Analysis for General
Jurisdiction Based on Appointment of Corporate Agents, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 461,
491-92 (1989) (exploring arguments and concluding that registration-consent
may violate the Commerce Clause).
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The court suggested this concern in Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enterprises.374 Bendix was a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a state law that forced out-of-state corporations to
choose between registration-consent to general jurisdiction375 and
the statute of limitation defense. 376 The Court found that the law
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.377  The Court's
analysis focused primarily on the loss of the statute of limitation
defense,378 but Ohio's requirement that the corporation consent to
general jurisdiction, as opposed to specific jurisdiction, was critical
to the Court's holding. The Court stated that the "designation of an
agent subjects the foreign corporation to the general jurisdiction of
the Ohio courts in matters to which Ohio's tenuous relation would
not otherwise extend."379 Importantly, the Court described general
jurisdiction as a "substantial burden"380 and concluded that the
"extraction" of the consent through waiver of the limitation defense
was "an unreasonable burden on commerce." 81
Scholars and lower courts do not agree on the impact of Bendix
on corporation registration statutes.382 In the aftermath of Bendix,
most states no longer force corporations to choose between consent
to general jurisdiction and waiver of the statute of limitation
defense. Registration statutes nonetheless remain coercive and
374. 486 U.S. 888, 889 (1988).
375. Id. at 894-95 ("[A] designation with the Ohio Secretary of State of an
agent for the service of process likely would have subjected [defendant] to the
general jurisdiction of Ohio courts over transactions in which Ohio had no
interest.").
376. Id. at 888-91 ("The statute [of limitation] is tolled ... for any period
that a person or corporation is not 'present' in the State. To be present in Ohio,
a foreign corporation must appoint an agent for service of process, which
operates as consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.").
377. Id. at 894-95.
378. Some scholars have questioned why the Court did not independently
condemn this aspect of the Ohio law as a matter of due process. See Wendy
Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV.
529, 550-51, 557-58 n.152 (1991) (analyzing Bendix and questioning why "none
of the Justices seemed troubled by this extorted waiver of a constitutional
right").
379. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 892-93 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
380. Id. at 893.
381. Id. at 894-95.
382. See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1112-14 (Del. 1988) (relying in
part on Bendix to hold that registration-consent remains a viable basis for
jurisdiction); see also Lea Brilmayer, Professor, Yale Law School, Consent,
Contract, and Territory, The William B. Lockhart Lecture (Mar. 30, 1989), in 74
MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.86 (1989) (citing Bendix and stating that "[a]lthough the
case law on this issue is not entirely clear, such assertions of jurisdiction may
be unconstitutional"); Kipp, supra note 357, at 32-33 (arguing that Bendix is
ambiguous and that use of registration statutes to infer consent to general
jurisdiction is an "anachronism").
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punish nonregistration through fines and forfeiture of the right to
bring suit in local courts. 383 In sum, it is safe to conclude that
corporate registration does not always confer general jurisdiction
even under these other (not contacts-based) theories. Nor should
registration by itself satisfy the at-home standard for general
jurisdiction.
E. "Sliding Scale" or "Hybrid" Forms of Jurisdiction
Finally, some courts and commentators have suggested that
jurisdiction is proper in cases that fall between the definitions or
categories of specific and general jurisdiction. They object to strict
characterization of a case as falling in one category or the other.
They suggest either a "sliding scale" or "hybrid" approach. Professor
Richman proposes a sliding scale theory,384 and Professor Simard a
hybrid form of jurisdiction. 385 The theories vary slightly, but both
would find proper jurisdiction in fact patterns that are "near misses"
on both the relatedness and extent of contacts factors.
The sliding scale approach argues that jurisdiction may be fair
where the claim is somewhat related to the defendant's forum
contacts so long as the defendant also had a moderate amount of
forum contacts. 386 An example is a products liability claim based on
the defendant's regular sale of similar products in the forum state.
The plaintiff bought and was injured by the product in a second
state, but the defendant regularly sells similar products in the
forum state. The relationship of the claim to the forum contacts-
product similarity-would fall short of the meaningful link
causation test, and the extent of the defendant's forum state
contacts-regular sales-would fall short of the at-home standard.
Yet, the claim is not entirely unrelated, as would be an employment
383. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.02(a) (1996) ("A foreign corporation
transacting business in this state without a certificate of authority may not
maintain a proceeding in any court in this state until it obtains a certificate of
authority."); id. § 15.02(d) (providing civil penalties for transacting business
without a certificate of authority).
384. See William M. Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions: By Robert C.
Casad, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1343-46 (1984) (book review).
385. Simard, Hybrid Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 580-82 (noting problems
with sliding scale theory as applied to product similarity cases and arguing for a
restrained specific personal jurisdiction approach for "hybrid" cases). Some
observers have used the "hybrid" term to connote other theories of jurisdiction.
See Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez!
Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International
Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 136-40 & n.178 (2012)
(proposing an aggregation of contacts across state lines for foreign national
corporations under "hybrid" label). I use the term "hybrid" to describe a
blending of the two International Shoe factors-relatedness and extent of
contacts.
386. Richman, supra note 384.
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claim filed by a corporate headquarters employee. Likewise, the
contacts are not few or isolated but are instead many and regular.
The sliding scale theory argues that the combination of the two
intermediate levels on both elements makes jurisdiction fair.
A real life example of the sliding scale approach is Shoppers
Food Warehouse v. Moreno,387 decided en banc by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.388 There, the plaintiff, a
resident of the District, fell in a Maryland grocery store and brought
suit against the store in the District of Columbia. 389 The court found
personal jurisdiction based on the fact that the Maryland store had
advertised "extensively and over a substantial period of time in the
District's major circulation newspaper." 390 The court held that the
plaintiffs claim had a "discernible relationship" to this
advertising.391 The court did not consider whether the advertising
actually caused the plaintiff to go to the defendant's store in
Maryland. In other words, it did not base its finding of jurisdiction
on any form of causation test. Instead, the court found it sufficient
that plaintiffs claim was the type of claim that would be foreseeable
to the defendant. 392 On the other element of extent of contacts, the
court stated that a lesser level of contacts, such as a single or
sporadic advertising, would not be sufficient for jurisdiction. 393
Under the court's ruling, the intermediate level of both factors-
relatedness and extent of contacts-made jurisdiction fair.
The Moreno court was explicit about its intermediate approach,
but, in practice, a sliding scale theory might explain the holdings of
many courts which find general jurisdiction. 394 For example, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.,395 where
the Second Circuit purported to base general jurisdiction on less
than one percent of sales, the claim was loosely related to the
defendant's forum contacts, a product similarity.396 The claim
concerned curtain walls installed in Florida but which the defendant
387. 746 A.2d 320 (D.C. 2000).
388. Id. at 335-36; see also O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312,
320 (3d Cir. 2007) (surveying cases that do not make a "rigid distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction" and apply some sort of "sliding
scale").
389. Moreno, 746 A.2d at 322.
390. Id. at 336.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 335-36.
393. Id. at 336.
394. See Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 4, at 191-93 (studying
hundreds of cases and concluding that in most cases in which the court found
general jurisdiction, the claim was somehow related to the defendant's forum
contacts).
395. 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996).
396. Id. at 569-70; see supra notes 270, 274, 327 (discussing Metro. Life, 84
F.3d at 566, 569-570).
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also sold in the Vermont forum.397 The court likely would not have
based jurisdiction on an obviously unrelated claim-for example, an
employment contract claim brought by an employee at the
defendant's headquarters located in another state. Likewise, the
court likely would not have found jurisdiction over an out-of-state
consumer claim if the defendant had only a single, though similar,
sale in the forum state.398 Yet, the court never formally made these
distinctions and instead found jurisdiction seemingly based on a
theory of general jurisdiction.
The hybrid theory has a slightly different focus and involves a
case where the defendant has both a related nonpurposeful contact
and a purposeful nonrelated contact. It is demonstrated by a
hypothetical based on the manufacturer Audi in World-Wide
Volkswagen. The hypothetical assumes the actual claim at issue in
World-Wide Volkswagen-the plaintiffs' claim of injury in Oklahoma
by an allegedly defective Audi car sold to them in New York. The
hypothetical asks whether Audi, which did not contest jurisdiction
in the actual case, would have been subject to jurisdiction under
minimum contacts analysis. The problem assumes that Audi
regularly sells in Oklahoma cars similar to the car that the
Robinsons alleged caused them injury in Oklahoma.
This hypothetical has an underlying sliding scale fact pattern-
regular sales of similar products-but it adds another factor-the
plaintiffs injury in the forum state. Under a hybrid theory, the
addition of this factor might justify jurisdiction even where the two
factors are not at the intermediate levels essential for jurisdiction
under a sliding scale theory. The key is that a purposeful unrelated
contact combines with a nonpurposeful related contact. Under the
hybrid theory, this combination makes jurisdiction fair.
A hybrid theory might explain aspects of Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Asahi.399 In Asahi, Justice O'Connor refused to find
purposeful availment in a product suit based solely on the
manufacturer's putting that product into the stream of commerce. 400
She wanted something more: "an action of the defendant
397. Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 565. A similar analysis could explain the
holding in Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869
(Ala. 1985), where the out-of-state claims likewise concerned a product that the
defendant sold in the forum state. See supra note 327 (discussing Newco, 481
So. 2d at 869).
398. See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 385 & n.7
(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that, where the defendant has only one contact with the
forum state, a closer nexus may be required than in a case where the defendant
has "engaged in significant and continuing efforts to solicit business in the
forum state"), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also supra notes
138-46 (discussing Shute, 897 F.2d at 379-83, 385-86).
399. Simard, Hybrid Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 576-77.
400. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987).
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purposefully directed toward the forum State."401 Justice O'Connor
listed "additional conduct" that might "indicate an intent or purpose
to serve the market in the forum," including advertising in the
forum, establishing channels for advice to customers in the state,
and marketing a product through a distributor in the forum. 402 At
least some of these additional acts are not causally related to the
claim. For example, advertising the valve in California likely did
not cause the consumer-plaintiff to buy the valve or the motorcycle.
Similarly, the Taiwanese company probably would have purchased
valves from Asahi, regardless of whether Asahi advertised in
California.
It is difficult to discern the import of Justice O'Connor's
statements. One reading supports the hybrid theory. In other
words, jurisdiction is fair where there is both unrelated activity that
is not causally related but which is purposeful (the additional
factors she listed) and related activity that is not purposeful (the
actual valve that caused injury in California). Another reading is
narrow and addresses only the purposeful availment factor. Justice
O'Connor's list of additional conduct could be read not as a list of
contacts that would make an otherwise insufficient contact fair but
instead as a list of evidence indicating whether the related contact-
the valve at issue-was purposefully directed to California.
The Court elsewhere has not endorsed any blending of the two
forms of jurisdiction. The Court's listing of the four cases of
jurisdiction in International Shoe could be read as an attempt to
untangle the two forms.403 In Helicol, the Court addressed only
general jurisdiction, refusing to consider any other form.404 Most
recently, in Goodyear, the Court articulated general and specific
jurisdiction as two distinct categories: "Opinions in the wake of the
pathmaking International Shoe decision have differentiated between
general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked
jurisdiction."405
Moreover, policy analysis argues against jurisdiction based on
either a sliding scale or hybrid theory. First, as to a sliding scale
theory, an intermediate level as to both essential elements does not
make jurisdiction fair. As I set out above, mere similarity in product
is not a sufficient relationship on which to base specific jurisdiction,
401. Id. at 112.
402. Id.
403. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
404. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S.
408, 415 n.10 (1984).
405. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011) (citing Helicol, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9); see also J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-88 (2011) (distinguishing between
general and specific jurisdiction).
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and on the extent of contacts factor, sales and advertising, alone, are
not enough for general jurisdiction. The sliding scale or hybrid
theories would be a partial "fix" in that they would rein in some
otherwise potentially extreme forms of jurisdiction. In other words,
a court would assert jurisdiction only over similar product sales, not
entirely unrelated employment suits, and do so only where there is
at least a moderate level of sales, not a single sale or advertisement.
Yet, the fix likely is not good enough. 406
The benefits of even moderate levels of sales volume would not
be reciprocal to the burden of having to defend all product claims
based on all worldwide sales of that or similar products. The
defendant still would not have fair warning of its potential exposure
to suit in the forum, even if limited to product liability. Rather, it
would have to assume that any steady stream of product sales would
expose it to suit there on all product claims arising anywhere in the
world. In this case, the state still would be asserting authority over
activities that occur exclusively outside its borders. There would be
little or no evidentiary concern in the forum because the products
were sold and caused injury elsewhere.
The hybrid theory also fails this policy analysis. The
combination of unrelated-but-purposeful contacts and related-but-
not-purposeful contacts does not make jurisdiction fair. In the Audi
hypothetical, the car sales are not by themselves enough to justify
jurisdiction, for the same reasons that a sliding scale theory fails the
policy analysis. The question is whether the addition of the related
contact-injury in the forum state-makes it fair. A requirement of
the forum-state injury narrows the extent of jurisdiction
significantly over the typical sliding scale fact pattern. Jurisdiction
would extend to a much smaller group of claims-only those brought
by plaintiffs who happen to be injured in the state. This smaller
sphere lessens some but not all of the policy concerns.
The mere fact that the potential for suit is smaller means that
the burdens of jurisdiction do not as significantly outweigh the
benefits. In addition, the state would have a sovereignty interest
over the injury, and some evidentiary convenience would come from
the in-state injury. But this injury remains an unpredictable
fortuity, which is precisely why the Court found no purposeful
availment and no jurisdiction in the actual World- Wide Volkswagea
406. Few lower courts have addressed the question of blended jurisdiction,
but the Third Circuit rejected it in O'Connor. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel
Co., 496 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mary Twitchell, Burnham and
Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 666 (1991))
("When courts confine general and specific jurisdiction to their separate
spheres, potential defendants can anticipate and control their jurisdictional
exposure.... Under a 'hybrid' approach, by contrast, all factors come together
in 'a sort of jurisdictional stew."').
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case. 407 Amenability to suit would travel with the product, a concept
repeatedly rejected by Court.40s To find jurisdiction on these facts
would mean that all sellers of products would have to assume
jurisdiction on any product they sold anywhere.
In sum, an assertion of jurisdiction that is otherwise unfair is
not made fair by making modest adjustments in either the degree of
relationship or the extent of local contacts. The four fairness
concerns demonstrate that the claim must be either sufficiently
related or the contacts must be sufficiently extensive. Jurisdiction
is fair only when there either is a meaningful causal relationship
between the claim and the defendant's forum contacts or enough
contacts to make the defendant at home in the forum state.
CONCLUSION
General jurisdiction warranted a "fresh look." Although the
doctrine has historical pedigree, it has long been ill-defined. In
breaking its twenty-year silence on personal jurisdiction in 2011, the
Court provided a good occasion for another look at general
jurisdiction. McIntyre captures the jurisdictional policy debate
among the current members of the Court and thus provides a useful
springboard for examining the policies underlying personal
jurisdiction as a whole and general jurisdiction in particular. The
unanimous decision in Goodyear clarifies the proper standard for
general jurisdiction-"at home" as opposed to merely "continuous
and systematic." Although neither case settles the policy questions
or standards for general jurisdiction, they both advance
understanding of the issues.
As reflected in the debate between Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg in McIntyre, the Court has proposed a wide range of
policies underlying personal jurisdiction. The fundamental policy
aim is fairness, but fairness in the context of personal jurisdiction is
not limited to either the sovereignty concern advocated by Justice
Kennedy or the litigation convenience noted by Justice Ginsburg.
Fairness can and should include a number of considerations. The
Court has developed and debated these policy considerations in the
context of specific jurisdiction but not general jurisdiction.
I propose that International Shoe itself provides essential
guidance in the form of the two factors critical to minimum contacts
analysis-relatedness and extent of contacts. Understanding why
407. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980).
408. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296) ("[T]his Court has rejected the notion that a
defendant's amenability to suit 'travels with the chattel."'); see also Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2856 (rejecting the view that a substantial seller of goods is
amenable to suit "wherever its products are distributed").
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and how these two factors impact the fairness of personal
jurisdiction both informs general personal jurisdiction as a whole
and defines the factors themselves. I contend that the factors
impact the fairness of jurisdiction in four ways: they help achieve
reciprocity between the benefits and burdens of entering a state;
they give predictability to the consequences of entering a state; they
limit a state's sovereignty to either actions or persons in its borders;
and they assure a level of convenience. This understanding in turn
helps define the parameters of the factors themselves.
The threshold question of relatedness is the most difficult. I
propose that a midlevel causation test best fits both the Court's
jurisprudence and the four fairness policies. This test would require
a meaningful link between the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's
forum state contacts. In other words, general jurisdiction properly
applies to all claims that do not have a meaningful causal link, and
specific jurisdiction analysis, in the form of the two-prong World-
Wide Volkswagen test, applies to claims that have this meaningful
link. This meaningful link test would not demand that a formal
element of the claim occur in the state, but it would require some
connection greater than mere unrestrained but-for causation. By
requiring this degree of relatedness before specific jurisdiction
analysis applies, this test gives a rough reciprocity between forum
benefits and jurisdictional burdens, gives the defendant a
reasonable degree of predictability, limits state power to matters
over which it has legitimate sovereignty, and assures some litigation
convenience.
The second question of the extent of contacts necessary for
general jurisdiction was made easier by Goodyear. General
jurisdiction is proper only in the state, or states, in which the
defendant is currently at home. The standard is not whether the
defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with a state but
is instead whether the defendant is currently at home in the state.
This at-home standard applies to natural persons, but, contrary to
the Court's dictum, it does not always align with legal domicile. As
to corporations, the state of incorporation and principal place of
business (under a Hertz "nerve center" definition) always will
constitute the home state. These places usually will be the only
home states for purposes of general jurisdiction. Sales and other
business activities in the state, including high volumes of sales,
physical operations, "doing business," and statutory registration, are
not by themselves enough to support general jurisdiction. Because
the burdens of general jurisdiction are unlimited, only the unique
affiliation of home achieves reciprocity between forum benefits and
burdens, gives sufficient predictability for unrelated suits, limits
state power to persons legitimately within the state's sovereignty,
and gives a sufficient measure of litigation convenience.
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Just as with many other constitutional doctrines, courts must
develop the standards through case application. These two
standards-"meaningful link" and "at home"-will give courts a
better starting point for general jurisdiction analysis, and the four
fairness concerns will aid the courts in interpreting and applying
the standards. Courts should strive to apply both standards in a
manner that helps achieve reciprocity, protects predictability, limits
sovereignty, and promotes convenience. These four policy aims are
rooted in International Shoe itself. They explain the fairness of
general personal jurisdiction.
